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The Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Plan represents the most significant privatization of the delivery
of a public insurance benefit in recent history, with dozens of private insurers offering a wide range
of products with varying prices and product features; the typical elder had a choice of roughly 40 stand-alone
drug plans.  In this paper we evaluate the choices of elders across this wide array of Part D options
using a unique data set of prescription drug claims matched to information on the characteristics of
choice sets.  We first document that the vast majority of elders are choosing plans that are not on the
“efficient portfolio” of plan choice in the sense that an alternative plan offers better risk protection
at a lower cost.  We then estimate several discrete choice models to document three dimensions along
which elders are making choices which are inconsistent with optimization under full information: elders
place much more weight on plan premiums than they do on expected out of pocket costs; they place
almost no value on variance reducing aspects of plans; and they value plan financial characteristics
beyond any impacts on their own financial expenses or risk.These findings are robust to a variety of
specifications and econometric approaches. We develop an "adjusted" revealed preference approach
that combines data from consumer choices with ex ante restrictions on preferences, and find that in
a partial equilibrium setting, restricting the choice set to the three lowest average cost options would
have likely raised welfare for elders under the program.
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  The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, better known as the legislation that added the 
Part D prescription drug benefit to the Medicare program, represents the single most significant 
expansion of public insurance programs in the U.S. in the past 40 years.  The most novel, and 
controversial, feature of this legislation was the use of multiple private insurance providers to 
deliver this new public insurance product.  Unlike the traditional model of government mandated 
uniform insurance packages for all enrollees, under the Part D program dozens of private 
insurers were allowed to offer a wide range of products with varying prices and product features.  
Perhaps most well-known was the extent to which plans covered the “donut hole”, a broad 
uncovered range of expenditures in the minimum mandated plan. 
  This unprecedented privatization of the delivery of a public insurance product raises a 
host of important policy questions.  Primary among these is the impacts of allowing choice 
across so many private insurance options.  The typical elder in our data (described below) faces a 
choice of over 40 stand-alone drugs plans, and our estimates suggest that the range of cost from 
the most to least expensive option facing an elder is comparable to the mean of those costs.  
Choice is clearly meaningful in this context.  Yet, to date, we know almost nothing about how 
elders are making these crucial choices. 
  This paper investigates the choices of elders for the newly formed Part D program in 
2006.  We analyze data that provides information on the Part D plans chosen and prescription 
drug utilization for a large sample of elders in the U.S.  These data were collected by Wolters 
Kluwer (WK), a “switch agent” that lies between pharmacies that fill prescriptions and the 
insurance companies and prescription benefit managers that pay for them.   WK collects 
information on almost one-third of all third party prescription drug transactions, and we will use 
the universe of their data for those over age 65 during 2005-2006 to examine choice of Part D   2 
plan.  We match to this data set a comprehensive set of information from the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) on the Part D plans available to each person in our data 
set. 
  Specifically, for each elder whose claims appear in our sample, we model the financial 
implications of each of the plans in their choice set, based on both 2005 and 2006 drug utilization 
and several different models of expectations. We begin by presenting the basic facts on choice, 
documenting that the vast majority of elders are choosing plans that are not on the “efficient 
portfolio” of plan choice for that elder.  We then turn to more rigorous multinomial models of 
individual choice to incorporate non-financial characteristics, preference heterogeneity and 
unobserved plan characteristics into our analysis. 
  Our findings are striking: along three dimensions, elders are making choices which are 
inconsistent with optimization under full information.  First, elders place much more weight on 
plan premiums than they do on the expected out of pocket costs that they will incur under the 
plan.  Second, they substantially under-value variance reducing aspects of alternative plans.  
Finally, consumers appear to value plan financial characteristics far beyond any impacts on their 
own financial expenses or risk.  These findings are robust to a variety of specifications and 
econometric approaches. 
  We attempt to interpret the magnitude of our results by analyzing the impact of restricting 
the option set offered to elders under Part D.   We develop an "adjusted" revealed preference 
approach that combines data from consumer choices with ex ante restrictions on preferences.  
We find that in a partial equilibrium setting, restricting the choice set to the three lowest average 
cost options would have likely raised welfare for elders under the program.   3 
  Our paper proceeds as follows.  Part I provides background on the Part D program and 
reviews the growing literature on its impacts.  Part II discusses our data sources, and Part III 
presents initial results on choice set variation and choice behavior.  Part IV describes our choice 
framework, and Part V presents results.  Part VI shows the welfare analysis based on these 
models, and Part VII concludes. 
 
Part I: Background  
The Medicare Part D Program 
  Medicare, which provides universal health insurance coverage to those over age 65 and to 
those on the disability insurance program, was established in 1965. The original program 
covered most medical needs for the elderly and disabled, including hospital and doctor costs, but 
it excluded coverage for prescription drugs.  This omission was not perceived as a major one in 
the early years of the Medicare program, but in the 1990s the advancement of prescription drug 
treatments for common illnesses among the elderly drew attention to this gap in Medicare 
coverage. Medicare recipients, for example, spent an average of $2,500 each on prescription 
drugs in 2003, more than twice what the average American spent on all health care in 1965.
1   
  In 2003, the Bush administration and Congress reached agreement on a far-reaching 
prescription drug benefit package at a projected cost to the federal government of $40 billion per 
year for its first ten years.  The most noticeable innovation of the Part D plan is that this new 
Medicare benefit is not delivered by the government, but rather by private insurers under 
contract with the government.  Beneficiaries can choose from three types of private insurance 
plans coverage of their drug expenditures.  The first is stand-alone plans called Medicare 
                                                 
1 Data for prescription drug spending comes from the Congressional Budget Office (2002). Data for average 
Americans’ health spending comes from the “National Health Expenditures” section of the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services’ National Health Accounts.    4 
Prescription Drug Plans (PDP) (a plan that just offers prescription drug benefits). In 2006, there 
were 1429 total PDPs offered throughout the nation, with most states offering about forty PDPs. 
The majority of PDPs are offered by a dozen national or near national companies.  
  The second alternative is Medicare Advantage (MA) plans, plans that provide all 
Medicare benefits, including prescription drugs, such as HMO, PPO, or Private FFS plans. There 
were 1314 total plans nationally in 2006.  Finally, beneficiaries could retain their current 
employer/union plan, as long as coverage is “creditable” or at least as generous (i.e. actuarially 
equivalent) as the standard Part D plan, for which they would receive a subsidy from the 
government 
  Under Part D, recipients are entitled to basic coverage of prescription drugs by a plan 
with a structure actuarially equivalent to the following: none of the first $250 in drug costs each 
year; 75% of costs for the next $2,250 of drug spending (up to $2,500 total); 0% of costs for the 
next $3,600 of drug spending (up to $5,100 total, the “donut hole”); and 95% of costs above 
$5,100 of drug spending.  Over 90% of beneficiaries in 2006, however, are not enrolled in the 
standard benefit design, but rather are in plans with low or no deductibles, flat payments for 
covered drugs following a tiered system, or some form of coverage in the donut hole. The main 
requirement for plans is that they must have equal or greater actuarial value than the standard 
benefit.
2  The government also placed restrictions on the structure of the formularies that plans 
could use to determine which prescription medications they would ensure.  Overall, Part D 
sponsors have great flexibility in terms of plan design. 
  Enrollment in Part D plans was voluntary for Medicare eligible citizens, although 
Medicare recipients not signing up by May 15, 2006 were subject to a financial penalty if they 
eventually joined the program (to mitigate adverse selection in the choice of joining the 
                                                 
2 Cover Memo for Medicare Part D Benefit Parameters: Annual Adjustments for Standard Benefit in 2007 (CMS)    5 
program).  One group, however, was automatically enrolled: low income elders who had been 
receiving their prescription drug coverage through state Medicaid programs (the “dual 
eligibles”).  These dual eligibles were enrolled in Part D plans by default if they did not choose 
one on their own.  The Part D plans for dual eligibles could charge copayments of only $1 for 
generics/$3 for name brand drugs for those below the poverty line, and only $2 for generics/$5 
for name brand drugs for those above the poverty line, with free coverage above the out of 
pocket threshold of $3600.
3 
  Despite reluctance voiced before the legislation passed, there was enormous interest from 
insurers in participating in the Part D program.  By November 2006, 3,032 plans were being 
offered to potential Part D enrollees.  Every county in the nation had at least 27 plans available; 
the typical county had 48 plans, while some counties featured more than 70 choices, primarily 
due to high number of MA plans.
4   
  Enrollment in the new Part D program was initially fraught with problems, but in the 
following months the federal government was able to iron out many of the problems that had 
arisen during the initial transition.  As of June 2006, there were 10.4 million people enrolled in 
stand alone PDP plans, 5.5 million people enrolled in MA plans and about 6 million dual 
eligibles.
5  Yet 73% of people over 65 felt that the Medicare prescription drug benefit was too 
                                                 
3 In addition, two other groups receive substantial subsidies – those found eligible for Low Income Subsidy (LIS) or 
for Partial Subsidy by the SSA. To qualify for LIS, beneficiaries must have income less than 135% of poverty and 
resources less than $7,500/individual or $12,000 couple.  This group received benefits comparable to the dual 
eligibles with incomes above 100% of poverty.  To qualify for Partial Subsidy, beneficiaries must have income at 
135%-150% of poverty and resources less than $11,500/individual or $23,000/couple.  This group can enroll in 
plans with a $50 deductible, a 15% copayment up to the out of pocket threshold, and $2/$5 copayments above that 
point.   In addition, premiums are fully paid by the government up to 135% of poverty, and then partially subsidized 
up to 150% of poverty. 
 
4 Details on number of plans in a median county obtained from Prescription Drug Plan Formulary and Pharmacy 
Network Files for 2006, provided by CMS.  
5 Enrollment data (rounded) taken from CMS, State Enrollment Data spreadsheet at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/PrescriptionDrugCovGenIn/02_EnrollmentData.asp#TopOfPage. Enrollment numbers also 
available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7453.pdf.   6 
complicated, while 91% of pharmacists and 92% of doctors expressed this concern.  When asked 
if they agree with the statement “Medicare should select a handful of plans that meet certain 
standards so seniors have an easier time choosing,” 60% of seniors answered “Yes.”
6 
  Despite these reservations, there were no signs of diminished plan choice in subsequent 
years.  The number of PDPs increased by about 30% in 2007, from 1,429 to 1,875 and remained 
at this level in 2008.
7   
Issues of Elder Choice in Part D 
  The use of this private delivery device, with such a multiplicity of choices, is a novel 
feature of the Part D legislation.  Standard economic theory would suggest that this is a 
beneficial plan feature: allowing individuals to choose across a wide variety of plans that meet 
their needs, rather than constraining them to a limited set of choices being made by the 
government, can only increase welfare in the standard model in a partial equilibrium setting. 
  But there are reasons to believe that the standard model is insufficient, particularly for a 
population of elders.  There is growing interest in behavioral economics in models where agents 
are better off with a more restricted choice set, as nicely reviewed in Iyengar and Kamenica 
(2006).  Recent theoretical work shows that the traditional “more is better” principle may be 
reversed in choice set contexts, for example when the presence or absence of options conveys 
information (Kamenica, 2006; Kuksov and Villas-Boas, 2005) or when agents have preferences 
with regret (Irons and Hepburn, 2003; Sarver, 2005).  And a growing body of empirical work 
shows that individuals are less likely to participate in markets where they face more choice; 
decisions to purchase a good (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000; Boatwright and Nunes, 2001), take a 
                                                 
6 Kaiser Family Foundation and Harvard School of Public Health (2006). 
7 Hoadly et al. (2006).  Data on 2008 plans taken from CMS 2008 PDP Landscape Source (v. 09.25.07) available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/prescriptiondrugcovgenin/.   7 
loan (Bertrand et al., 2005) or enroll in a 401(k) plan (Iyengar, Huberman and Jiang, 2004) are 
found to decrease when participation requires choosing from a larger set of alternatives. 
  Iyengar and Kamenica (2006) find that not only the decision to participate in a market, 
but also the nature of choice itself, is affected by the size of the option set.  They investigate 
choice over asset allocation in both laboratory and real-world (pension plan choice) settings, and 
find that individuals opt for safer investments when faced with a larger range of risky choices.  In 
particular, they find that the presence of more investment options in a 401(k) plan leads to more 
frequent choice of money market or bond options rather than equity investment.  Iyengar and 
Lepper (2000) also find that satisfaction with choices made falls with the size of the choice set in 
several experimental settings. 
  These issues may be paramount within the context of the elderly, given that the potential 
for cognitive failures rises at older ages.  Salthouse (2004) shows clear evidence that the 
performance on a series of memory and analytic tasks declines sharply after age 60.  Part of the 
reason for this may be the rise in incidence of dementia with age; starting at age 60, dementia 
rates roughly double every five years (Fratiglioni et al., 1999).  A recent study by Agarwal et al. 
(2006) shows that in ten different contexts, ranging from credit card interest payments to 
mortgages to small business loans, the elderly pay higher fees and face higher interest rates than 
middle-aged consumers.  These types of findings raise particular concern about choice in the Part 
D context. 
Previous Studies of Part D Choice 
  We are aware of only three previous studies of these issues in the context of Part D.  The 
first is a set of studies by Dan McFadden and colleagues, as summarized in McFadden (2006).  
These researchers surveyed a set of elders about their plans for enrolling in Part D programs, and   8 
evaluate whether enrollment intentions in the plan were “rational” given the penalties for delay.  
They find that 71% of potential enrollees were making the appropriate decision (under various 
assumptions about discount rates, etc.), while 10% of enrollees did not intend to enroll when it 
would be in their interests to do so, and 19% intended enroll when it would be in their interest to 
delay.  Thus, for most potential enrollees, the decision over whether to enroll seems to be made 
rationally. 
  Their findings are less sanguine, however, for choice of Part D plan.  This survey offered 
individuals a choice of the standard plan described above versus alternatives that provide 
different levels of insurance coverage (e.g. catastrophic only, complete coverage, etc.), with 
corresponding actuarially fair premiums.  They find that only about 36% of enrollees choose the 
cost-minimizing plan, and they do not place much value on the insurance aspects of more 
comprehensive plans.  They conclude that “consumers are likely to have difficulty choosing 
among plans to fine-tune their prescription drug coverage, and do not seem to be informed about 
or attuned to the insurance feature of Part D plans.”   
  While this is an interesting set of findings, it provides only a preliminary look at the 
crucial issue of plan choice.   These conclusions are based on data which do not contain precise 
detail about the prescription drugs used by individuals; assumptions about utilization are made 
using aggregate imputations from other sources.  Moreover, this is based on hypothetical choices 
across a set of non-existing plans; individuals may become educated about the program when 
they are actually faced with plan choices.  Thus, the failures of choice documented by McFadden 
(2006) may not hold when we use data on actual individual utilization and choices. 
  A recent paper by Lucarelli, Prince and Simon (2008) uses aggregate data on plan market 
shares to conduct a study of how plan features impact demand and to undertake a welfare   9 
analysis of choice restrictions.  They estimate sizeable welfare losses from limiting the option set 
facing seniors.  But they do so in a framework which assumes that seniors are choosing 
optimally so that by definition restricting the choice set can only be harmful.  Without 
individualized data on plan choices, they are unable to evaluate the underlying efficacy of plan 
choice. 
  Most closely related to our work is a recent field experiment by Kling et. al. (2008).  
They examine how providing people with information about the relative costs of each of the 
available plans in 2007 computed using their 2006 claims impacts their choices.  They find that 
individuals who receive this intervention are more likely to switch plans, and more likely to end 
up with lower predicted and realized costs.  Using our richer dataset on patient claims, we are 
able to model the individualized risk characteristics of plans in addition to looking just at average 
costs.  Our model is also more general in terms of sample and implications.  While they 
investigate the consequences of one particular intervention on a sample of patients at a single 
hospital, our model allows us to calculate the potential welfare gains from reforms which change 
the structure of the choice set, and to do so for a large fraction of Medicare Part D enrollees. 
 
Part II: Data 
  Our primary data source is a longitudinal sample of prescription drug records from the 
Wolters Kluwer (WK) Company.  They are the largest “switch” operator in the prescription drug 
market: they collect the electronic claims from pharmacies and pass them on to the Pharmacy 
Benefit Managers (PBMs) and insurance companies that will pay the claims.  After adjudicating 
the claim, it is passed back through the switch to the pharmacy. WK performs this function for a 
large sample of pharmacies throughout the U.S.  Once pharmacies are in their sample, there is a   10 
93% chance that they remain enrolled, so this is effectively a longitudinal sample of pharmacies.  
On average the claims captured by the WK system represent almost 31% of all 3
rd party 
prescription claims filled in the U.S.
8  The geographic distribution of these data is very closely 
representative of the geographic distribution of 3
rd party claims as well; the correlation between 
the WK market share and the overall 3
rd party market share across each of the states is 0.86. 
  WK keeps a longitudinal file that tracks prescription drug use for more than 100 million 
persons in the U.S.  They have made available to us for research purposes a longitudinal sample 
of prescription claims for any individuals age 65 and over in 2005.   
These data are crucial because they are the only available data (of which we are aware) that 
contain information both on specific drug utilization by elders and on plan choice.  Information 
about specific drug utilization is key because plan costs vary tremendously based on drug 
utilization, as we discuss below.   
  We begin with a sample of 2.7 million elders who (a) have a Part D claim, (b) are not 
employer-insured, dual eligibles or eligible for low-income subsidies/partial subsidies, (c) have 
claims for only one region of the country, (d) have no claims with missing payment information, 
(e) are in the sample of consistently reporting pharmacies, and (f) have data for both 2005 and 
2006.  This data file has a rich set of information about every drug claim for individuals in the 
longitudinal sample, including information on: month in which the prescription was filled; 
county of location of the pharmacy; a de-personalized patient id which allows longitudinal 
patient linkages; patient age; NDC code for the drug; quantity measures (days supply, dosage, 
package size); patient and insurer payments; price of purchase; and insurer or PBM name. 
  WK has created a sample for us that links longitudinally all claims from elders that fill 
prescriptions at a pharmacy in their sample.  Thus, there are three types of attrition from the 
                                                 
8 Figure based on data provided by WK for Q3:2006.   11 
sample.  First, elders may die (in which case we still observe all of their claims).  Second, 
pharmacies may enter or leave the sample.  This can be addressed by using only pharmacies that 
are continuously in their sample.
9   Finally, individuals may switch pharmacies.  If the switch is 
to a pharmacy within the WK sample, then the company does a detailed statistical match to 
ensure that the patient is captured and matched to other prescriptions (based on the de-identified 
form of data fields such as first name, last name, date of birth, year of birth, gender, health 
insurance id and zip code).  If the switch is outside of the WK sample, then the individuals will 
be lost to this sample.  
  Unfortunately, there is no way to capture such transitions.  But we can assess their 
importance by taking advantage of the fact that Wolters Kluwer provided us with a coverage 
level variable which indicates the proportion of pharmacies in each county which are covered by 
Wolters Kluwer.  We have rerun our models on the 10% of counties where WK covers at least 
40% of all third-party prescriptions, and our results are very similar to what we report below.  
This suggests that attrition is not significantly biasing our results. 
The CMS Plans Database 
  We obtain information on availability of Part D plans and specific plan features directly 
from four files provided by CMS: the plan information file, the beneficiary cost file, the 
formulary file and the geographic locator file.   The plan information file lists plan names and 
identifiers, and regions/counties in which plans are offered.  The beneficiary cost file contains 
copays and coinsurance rates for different tiers of each plan.  The formulary file contains a list of 
all the drugs that are included on the formulary for each plan.  The geographic locator file allows 
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weekends and holidays) of reporting in a month.    12 
us to identify all the Social Security Administration (SSA) counties that correspond to different 
PDP and MA regions.  
  The major strength of the CMS data is that it allows us to fully parameterize any elder’s 
plan choice set based on their location.  We have used these data to build a “cost calculator” that 
mimics the calculator provided on Medicare’s web site.  This calculator uses a given set of 
prescriptions for a given elder to compute their projected out of pocket spending in each plan 
available in their county. 
Matching patients to their Part D Plan 
  One challenging aspect of the WK data is that we know each patient’s county and the 
name of the company that provides the Part D plan that is covering each prescription, but not 
specifically which Part D plan offered by that company is covering the prescription.  For 
example, we know that an elder is covered by a Humana product, but not whether it is Humana 
Complete, Humana Enhanced, etc. 
  Fortunately, we can resolve this matching problem in most cases by using a combination 
of county code, company name, and copayment structure.  For each claim and each of the plans 
within the same company offered in a particular county, we check if the copay that the patient 
paid for this claim matches any of the prescribed copays of the plan. We assign a person to a plan 
if most of their claims match to the same unique Part D plan.  We carry out this exercise for each 
month.  To confirm that a person has been matched to a correct Part D plan, we look at all the 
months together and insist that a person be consistently matched to the same plan in each month 
from June 2006 on, since enrollment into Part D plans was open until May 15
th 2006. 
  Of the approximately 2.7 million individuals in our sample, 776,118 were matched to 
Part D plans.  The remainder were excluded either because they had a large number of non-Part   13 
D claims (implying that they have some other form of coverage), because they had too few 
claims to reliably match, or because their copays were inconsistent with the copays listed for Part 
D plans in their region.   
  Of the matched individuals, 57.1% were uniquely matched to a Part D plan, 42.9% were 
multiply matched (meaning that more than one Part D plan was consistent with their copays).  
While the unique matches are clear, excluding multiple matches leads us to misstate the 
proportion of enrollment in some plans.  This problem is especially severe among Humana plans 
because Humana offers several plans which differ only in the deductible and donut hole coverage 
and thus cannot generally be distinguished on the basis of copays.  While comprising 20% of all 
matches, Humana plans are only 10% of unique matches.  To deal with this problem, we include 
both unique and multiple matches, with multiple matches randomly assigned to one of the plans 
to which they are matched with probability equal to the proportion of total national enrollment in 
that plan in 2006.
10   In fact, if we restrict only to unique matches, our results are considerably 
stronger (e.g. the anomalies we document below are heightened as are the utility gains from 
restricting the choice set).
11 
Construction of Out of Pocket Cost Variables 
  The total enrollee costs of Part D can be decomposed into premiums, which are known 
for certain at the time of plan choice, and the distribution of out of pocket costs given the 
information available at the time when plans are chosen.  Our focus is on estimating the 
distribution of costs given all of the information potentially available to individuals at the time 
                                                 
10 Regional enrollment figures are not available at the plan level in 2006 for most plans.   
11 One might still worry that if we include all matches our results are driven by misassignment of multiple matches, 
while if we include just unique matches our results are driven by selecting for plans which are easier to match 
(although it seems unlikely that both issues would coincidentally lead to the same estimates).  To deal with this 
objection, we estimated an earlier version of our models using the full sample of unique and multiple matches and 
the correct likelihood function given the random assignment of multiple matches (following Hausman et. al. 1997).  
This correction appears to make little difference, in part due to the fact that most multiple matches could be assigned 
with a high level of confidence.   14 
when they make their choice.  There are three reasons that estimating this distribution is 
challenging: first, we only observe realized out of pocket costs for the plan in which an 
individual is enrolled; second, we observe only a single realization of out of pocket costs for 
each individual (making it impossible to compute a variance measure); and third, we do not 
observe all of the information available to individuals at the time when they make their choice. 
  To handle the first difficulty, we assume that the set of 2006 claims is fixed and would 
remain constant had the individual in question chosen a different plan; that is, we assume no 
moral hazard.  This assumption allows us to use the calculator to determine what each 
individual’s realized costs would be for each plan in their choice set.  Given typical estimates of 
the elasticity of prescription drug utilization in the range of 0.2 to 0.5, and considering that this 
would only impact our results to the extent that individuals have sufficient foresight to take into 
account future utilization effects in their plan choices, this is a fairly innocuous assumption.  A 
formal model and empirical results are provided to justify this claim in Appendix A. 
  To handle the second difficulty, we sample realized costs from 200 individuals who are 
“identical” to the individual in question at the time when the plan choice is made.  In practice, we 
define “identical” as individuals with the same decile of 2005 drug expenditures, 2005 days 
supply of branded drugs and 2005 days supply of generic drugs; after extensive searching, we 
found that this combination provided the best prediction of 2006 prescription drug spending 
based on 2005 characteristics.  We therefore assign each individual to one of 1000 cells 
demarcated by the interacted deciles of these measures. We restrict our sample to individuals for 
whom there are at least 200 other individuals in their cell, and we use these 200 individuals in 
each cell to compute both our rational expectations measure of utilization in 2006 (described 
below) and our variance measure.   15 
  The third difficulty is that individuals may actually know more than can be predicted 
given 2005 costs at the time when they make their plan choices.   Intuitively, we can attempt to 
determine whether individuals know more than can be predicted given 2005 costs by analyzing 
whether their choices are sensitive to the component of the variation in realized costs across 
plans which cannot be predicted given 2005 characteristics.  We develop a formal model of this 
approach in Part V. 
Final Sample Creation 
Under Part D individuals could enroll not only in a stand alone PDP plan, but also in a 
more comprehensive MA plan; we distinguish between individuals matched to MA and those 
matched to PDP plans based on copay and exclude the former.  We focus just on PDP plans (and 
therefore, just on individuals who chose PDP plans) because MA plans involve broader health 
care decisions which are beyond the scope of our data (e.g. regarding HMOs and fee-for-service 
plans).  This exclusion is justified by the “independence of irrelevant alternatives” assumption 
that underlies our logit modeling, as discussed (and tested) further below.  We also exclude 
individuals who have fewer than 500 observations in their state or fewer than 100 observations in 
their brand/state cell to increase the speed of estimation of the model by reducing the required 
number of brand/state fixed effects; this restriction has no effect on our final results.   
  Our final sample consists of 477,393 individuals.  The typical patient in this sample is 
almost 75 years old, three-fifths are female, and they have an average of 34 claims per year.  
Their total prescription drug spending averages $1711 per year.  While some individuals were 
enrolled in Part D for the full year, others enrolled as late as May.  The average total premiums 
paid after enrollment was $287 and the average OOP costs paid out over the same period was 
$666.  This is the sample used in the efficient frontier analysis below.  In our conditional logit   16 
models, we randomly subsample 20% of these individuals for computational reasons.  We 
estimate the more computationally demanding random coefficients models on a randomly chosen 
subsample of 15,000 patients. 
The distribution of enrollees across Part D plans is highly correlated in this final sample 
with the national facts on PDP enrollment provided by CMS.  The correlation between the share 
by brand in our sample and the CMS sample is 0.98, and the correlation between the share of our 
sample in the top 10 plans is correlated with the CMS reported share in those plans at 0.89 (the 
correlation for the top 100 plans is 0.91). 
 
Part III: Facts on Plan Choice 
  To motivate our regression framework, Figure 1 shows the basic facts on the relationship 
of plan choice to total plan costs.  For each individual in the data, we estimate the total cost of 
enrolling in each PDP plan in their county, adding both premiums and expected out of pocket 
costs.  We then estimate the difference in total costs between the plan chosen by that individual 
and the lowest cost plan in their county.  For this exercise, we use a perfect foresight model of 
expectations, using actual 2006 expenditures to estimate the costs that individuals face in each 
plan.   
  As Figure 1 shows, only 12.2% of individuals choose the lowest cost plan in their state.  
Indeed, on average, individuals could save 30.9% of their total Part D spending by choosing the 
lowest cost plan rather than the plan they chose.  If we redo these calculations using actual 2005 
expenditures, or predicted 2006 expenditures based on 2005 expenditures rather than actual 2006 
expenditures, we find even stronger deviations from the lowest cost plan.
12   
                                                 
12 It appears that some plans may have offered low premiums in 2006 in order to entice consumers to choose their 
plan in the first year of the Part D program before raising their premiums in subsequent years.  This behavior should   17 
  Of course, individuals are not simply choosing a fixed payment stream when choosing a 
Part D plan; individuals who are highly risk averse may explicitly be choosing plans with higher 
mean expenditure to protect themselves against variance in expenditure.  Yet this does not seem 
to be the case.  Even if we only include plan choices where the variance is non-increasing, over 
70% of enrollees could have chosen a lower cost plan, and the typical enrollee could have saved 
23.3% of their Part D expenditures without raising their variance.
13 
  The explanation for these facts is shown in Figure 2, which shows the choice set for 
individuals in California.  The X axis in this graph is the mean of total costs for each plan, and 
the Y axis is the average standard deviation in costs (where the standard deviation is computed 
using the 1000 cell method, and the average is taken across individuals).  In this graph, there is a 
clear “efficient frontier” of plans which dominate others in terms of both cost and variance.  This 
graph masks considerable heterogeneity across individuals: different plans lie on the efficient 
frontier for different individuals, so the fact that a plan lies off the efficient frontier in this graph 
does not imply that it is suboptimal for each individual.  Nonetheless, most of the plans are well 
off the efficient frontier, meaning individuals could have either lowered their mean costs or their 
variance by picking a different plan. 
  As we will document below, one reason for the large amount of choice off the efficient 
frontier is that individuals consider plan characteristics in making their choices – but not how 
those plan characteristics matter for themselves.  This is perhaps best illustrated by a simple 
examination of the decision to choose a plan with donut hole coverage.  Figure 3 shows the 
                                                                                                                                                             
not impact our analysis except insofar as there are large switching costs because consumers have the option to 
switch plans after each year, but one might still wonder to what extent the above results are driven by such plans.  
To assess this issue, we repeated the above analysis using the 2007 premiums for all plans and found that the 
average potential cost savings fell slightly from 30.9% to 25%. 
13 The fact that this number is smaller than the 30.9% number is because we are searching for cost savings over a 
small set of plans, not because individuals are especially sensitive to risk, a point we document further below.   18 
probability of choosing donut hole coverage, and the financial implications of doing so, sorted by 
2006 spending percentiles; the results are once again similar for other measures such as 2005 
actual spending or 2006 predicted spending.  The bottom line shows the percent of the 
population at each percentile choosing donut hole coverage; the top line shows the average 
savings for individuals in that quantile from switching from the lowest cost plan in their region 
which offers donut hole coverage to the lowest cost plan that does not.     
  The plans which offer donut hole coverage actually have slightly inferior coinsurances 
relative to the lowest cost non-donut hole plans in the initial coverage range, and so the cost of 
donut hole coverage is rising with expenditures until the point when individuals become likely to 
enter the donut hole. 
  The results here are striking: the percentage choosing donut hole coverage is virtually flat 
throughout the spending distribution at around 10%.  Even if individuals are willing to pay extra 
in mean costs for the protection provided by donut hole coverage, it is hard to rationalize the fact 
that the same proportion of individuals in the 10
th and 85
th percentile of the spending distribution 
choose donut hole coverage. 
 
Part IV: Base Model of Part D Plan Choice 
  In this section, we extend the efficient frontier analysis presented above by considering 
several discrete choice models.  These models serve three general purposes in our setting.  First, 
they allow us to control for additional plan characteristics such as plan quality.  Second, they 
allow us to understand more precisely how preferences combine with choice set characteristics 
so we can forecast how individuals might choose in counterfactual choice environments.  Third, 
they allow us to quantify the welfare consequences of choices.   19 
  We begin by specifying a CARA utility model with normally distributed costs 𝐶 and 
constant wealth ?: 
  ? 𝐶  = −exp −? ? − 𝐶   where 𝐶~? ?,𝜎2   (1)  
In this case, indirect utility is given by: 
 
? ?,𝜎2  =  𝐸? 𝐶  = −?exp(?? +
1
2
?2𝜎2)  (2)  
where ? = −exp(??) is a constant.  A first-order Taylor expansion about the point (?′,𝜎2′
) 
yields: 
  ? ?,𝜎2  ≈ ? ?′,𝜎2′
  − ??? ?′,𝜎2′





 (𝜎2 − 𝜎2′
) 
(3)  
Dropping constant terms (since these are irrelevant in the logit model), we obtain: 
 






 𝜎2  (4)  
We can write total costs as 𝐶 = 𝜋 + ??? and since 𝜋 is known for any given plan,  
??𝑟 𝐶  = ??𝑟 ???  = 𝜎2 and ? = 𝐸 𝐶  = 𝜋 + 𝐸 ???  = 𝜋 + ?∗.  Adding an error term, we 
can rewrite equation (4) as: 
 
? = −??? ?′,𝜎2′





 𝜎2 +  ?  (5)  
This maps into a conditional logit model of plan choice where the utility of individual i 
from choosing plan j is given by:  
  ??? = 𝜋??0 + ???
∗ ?1 + 𝜎??
2?2 + ??󲼸 + ?? ? ? + ???  (6)  
with ?0 = ?1 = ???(?∗′
,𝜎2′




).  In this equation ??? represents any 
financial plan characteristics which impact choice, ??(?) represents plan quality ratings and other   20 
non-financial aspects of plans (which vary only across brands), and ??? are i.i.d. type I extreme 
value random variables.  
  In this expression, ? =
2?2
?1
 allows us to map the ratio of the coefficients on the variance 
of costs and the coefficient on the mean of costs into the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.  
This assumes that wealth is constant across all states of the world: the only risk facing 
individuals is uncertainty about the distribution of out of pocket costs.  The same expression 
would hold if we added idiosyncratic risk that was uncorrelated with prescription drug 
expenditures, but it is not implausible that there would be correlated risks: in states of the world 
where prescription drug expenditures are higher, other medical expenditures are higher as well.  
Such correlated risks would tend to bias upwards our already low estimates of risk aversion.   
  We include in our model several financial plan characteristics beyond premiums, out of 
pocket costs, and the variance of out pocket costs.  These are: the deductible of the plan; a 
dummy for whether the plan covers all donut hole expenditures; a dummy for whether the plan 
covers generic expenditures in the donut hole only; and a cost-sharing index.  The cost sharing 
index is calculated for each plan as the average percentage of expenditures covered by the plan 
between the deductible and the donut hole.  This variable differs from expected out of pocket 
costs in that it has the same value for everyone in the sample for each plan, and because it is not 
directly impacted by whether plans have deductibles or donut hole coverage.  We also include 
two measures of plan quality: the share of the top 100 drugs used by elders that is included in the 
plan’s formulary and a quality index.  The quality index is computed by CMS on a 1-5 scale by 
aggregating consumer ratings at the brand level collected along 17 dimensions which are 
categorized as “Customer Service,” “Drug Pricing Information” (availability / rate of price 
changes), and “Using Your Plan to Get Your Prescription Filled”.   21 
  Identification is a natural concern in this context.  All of the plan characteristics included 
in our model may be endogenous due to unobserved demand factors, and they may be biased by 
correlation with unobserved plan characteristics.  To address this concern, we observe and 
include in our model all of the publicly available information that might be used by individuals 
to make their choices.  We also consider models where we control for a full set of brand 
dummies, as well as a full set of interactions of state dummies with brand dummies.  When we 
include brand dummies, the coefficient on the quality index (which is measured at the brand 
level) is no longer separately identified although it can be recovered by a GLS regression of 
these dummies on the quality variable.  When brand-state dummies are included, coefficients on 
plan characteristics such as the premium, deductible and donut hole coverage are identified by 
the variation across plans offered by the same brands in a given state.
14 
  Even with these fixed effects, it is possible that premiums are endogenous because they 
are set based on brand-state specific assessments of demand conditions.  If premiums are higher 
in regions where insurers anticipate more demand for their particular plan (relative to other plans 
offered by the same insurer), our estimate of the coefficient on premiums will be biased towards 
zero since individuals will appear to be less averse to higher premiums.  To the extent that these 
factors make high premiums appear less undesirable than they actually are, our conclusion that 
premiums are overweighted relative to out of pocket costs would be strengthened, as would our 
estimates of the welfare loss due to consumer mistakes.
15 
                                                 
14 For instance, in many states Humana offers a Standard plan with lower premiums but limited coverage, an 
Enhanced plan with higher premiums but no deductible, and a Complete Plan which offers superior cost sharing and 
full donut hole coverage at much higher premiums.  
15 We did attempt estimating the models reported below using two instruments using the control function approach: 
these were the average premium for a given plan in all states where the plan is offered (designed to avert local 
demand shocks) and a “marginal cost” instrument constructed using the average covered expenditures for 
individuals enrolled in the plan.  In both cases, the magnitude of the coefficient on premiums increased in the IV 
models.  We are not confident that the exclusion restriction is satisfied for either of these instruments, so we 
continue to estimate the model without an instrument below.    22 
Restrictions on Preferences 
  The model laid out above suggests three natural restrictions on preferences which extend 
the efficient frontier concept to the discrete choice setting.   
Restriction 1: ?0 = ?1 
  This restriction states that the coefficient on premiums should equal the coefficient on 
expected out of pocket costs.  Controlling for the risk characteristics of plans, individuals should 
be willing to pay exactly one dollar in additional premiums for coverage which reduces expected 
out of pocket costs by one dollar.  If this restriction fails to hold, individuals are not choosing on 
the efficient frontier: they could switch to alternative plans with comparable risk characteristics 
but lower total costs. 
Restriction 2: ? = ? 
  This restriction states that financial plan characteristics other than premiums, expected 
out of pocket costs and the variance of out of pocket costs do not impact choices.  Individuals 
should not care about deductibles, donut hole coverage or copays per se; they should only care 
about these factors to the extent that they impact the distribution of out of pocket costs.  Once we 
control for this distribution, these factors should be redundant. 
Restriction 3: ?2 < 0 
  This restriction states that individuals should be risk averse. 
  While these restrictions follow naturally from utility maximization with full information 
and standard preferences, the model from which they are derived makes several important 
functional form assumptions: we assume that the distribution of out of pocket costs can be 
summarized by its mean and variance, that indirect utility is a linear function of this mean and 
variance, and that the errors are i.i.d. type I extreme value.  In Appendix B, we show that the   23 
restrictions assumed in the previous section still hold even when these functional forms 
assumptions are weakened.
16  Of course, it is always possible to write down preferences that 
would violate the above restrictions, but these restrictions are generally compatible with 
commonly used expected utility functions given the observed cost distributions.  
Choice Model Results 
Table 1 reports the results from several conditional logit models.  Model (1) includes 
only the premium, realized out of pocket costs and the variance of out of pocket costs.  As noted 
in the discussion of the cost variables, expected out of pocket costs – meaning the individual’s 
expectation of out of pocket costs at the time of plan choice – is not directly observed, so we use 
realized costs as a proxy for expected out of pocket costs.  This proxy has noise (where “noise” 
includes the component of realized costs unknown to the individual at the time when the choice 
is made) and so its coefficient is biased downwards.  We address this problem at length in the 
next section and show that it does not much impact our conclusions.  
The cost variables – premiums and out of pocket costs – are measured in hundreds of 
dollars.  Model (1) therefore shows that a $100 increase in premiums leads to a 32% reduction in 
the probability that a given plan is chosen, implying an average elasticity of --0.75.
17  There are 
two ways to interpret the remaining coefficients.  First, we can divide by the premium coefficient 
in order to compute the willingness to pay in dollars for a one unit increase in the characteristic.  
Second, the coefficient itself can be interpreted as the percentage increase in the probability that 
                                                 
16 In particular, we simulate choices using the actual distribution of costs and several commonly used utility 
functions (CRRA, CARA) with varying levels of risk aversion.  In some cases, the restrictions do not hold exactly, 
but the violations are much smaller in magnitude than we observe when we estimate the model using actual choices. 
17 The implied elasticity varies across plans based on premium level and market share.  The “32%” number given in 
the text is derived from the equation 
? log 𝑝??  
?𝑥??
=  1 − 𝑝?? ?.  Thus, for 𝑝?? ≈ 0 which holds for a large number of 
plans, we can interpret ? as the percentage change in 𝑝?? associated with a one unit change in 𝑥??.   24 
a plan is chosen from a one unit increase in the characteristic provided that probability is small 
(as it is for most plans). 
Two points about the model (1) results are noteworthy.  First, the coefficient on out of 
pocket costs is only about ½ as large as the coefficient on premiums, violating Restriction 1.  
Second, the coefficient on the variance term is negative and significant, but extremely small, 
implying risk aversion substantially less than we obtained in the simulations with CRRA = 1.   
Model (2) adds additional covariates to control for deductibles, donut hole coverage, 
average cost sharing, formulary coverage and plan quality.  Many of these covariates enter the 
model with significant coefficients.  When we add plan characteristics, the coefficient on 
premiums increases suggesting that it was initially biased downward due to omitted variable 
bias.  The coefficient on the variance term drops even further once we add a control for the # of 
the most popular 100 drugs which are included in the plan’s formulary.  This suggests that while 
individuals prefer plans which cover more drugs, they do not have sufficient foresight to choose 
plans which cover drugs which they (or at least people in their cell) might need in the future but 
are not already taking.   
Models (3) and (4) add brand dummies and brand-state dummies respectively.  The 
coefficient on premiums actually shrinks once we include brand-dummies, but the effects of the 
premium remain large; a $100 increase in annual premiums leads to a 50% reduction in the 
probability that a plan is chosen, corresponding to an average elasticity of -1.17.  The coefficient 
on out of pocket costs has similar magnitude across all of the models, which reflects the fact that 
it is identified based on individual variation.  In columns (3) and (4) the coefficient on the 
premium is more than five times as large as the coefficient on out of pocket costs.   25 
  The coefficients on plan characteristics are also very large in all specifications.  
Controlling for the out of pocket cost consequences, model (4) – which has the smallest plan 
characteristics - suggests that individuals are willing to pay over $300 for full donut hole 
coverage, $50 for generic donut hole coverage, about $80 to go from a deductible of 250 to a 
deductible of 0, about $80 to go from the plan with the least cost sharing (25%) to the plan with 
the most cost sharing (65%), and $12 for each of the top 100 drugs which appear on the 
formulary.  These numbers are not enormous, but they are an order of magnitude larger than the 
results in the simulations, and have non-trivial consequences for the welfare evaluation of plan 
choice as we investigate in the welfare analysis section. 
  Thus, this formal modeling of choice reveals a violation of all three of the preference 
restrictions we laid out above.  The coefficient on premium is an order of magnitude larger than 
the coefficient on out of pocket expenditures; generalized plan characteristics enter the model 
highly significantly, even conditional on individual out of pocket risk; and individuals are not 
willing to pay more for plans with lower variance in expected spending. 
 
Part V: Modeling the Information Set of Consumers 
  In the previous section, we presented results from a conditional logit model of plan 
choice and identified three apparent irregularities in choices.  Our interpretation is that these 
results reflect consumer errors – plan characteristics are more salient than are their implications 
for the distribution of out of pocket costs, and individuals are unable to compute the 
individualized risk characteristics of the alternative plans.  In this section we consider an 
alternative explanation: we have misspecified out of pocket costs because we have failed to   26 
appropriately model the information available to individuals at the time when they make their 
plan choice. 
Thus far we have measured out of pocket costs using the realized cost measure 
constructed from 2006 claims.  An alternative measure that we consider in this section we label 
our “rational expectations” measure. Recall that to create our variance measure we classified all 
individuals into 1000 cells defined by deciles of 2005 total spending, generic prescriptions and 
branded prescriptions, and ran the 2006 claims of 200 persons in each cell through the cost 
calculator for that plan.  This procedure generates a distribution of costs for each patient and 
plan.  Our rational expectations measure is defined as the mean of this distribution.  Under the 
strong assumptions discussed above (CARA utility and a normal distribution of costs), the mean 
and the variance would completely summarize the impact of the cost distribution on utility.  Our 
simulations in Appendix B show that they summarize this distribution well anyway even if these 
assumptions are relaxed. 
It is useful to compare this rational expectations measure to the perfect foresight/realized 
costs measure we have been using.  The latter measure is “too broad” in the sense that it includes 
information not available to individuals at the time when they choose (provided that is, that they 
do not know exactly what their drug needs and drug prices will be for the coming year).  The 
former measure is “too narrow” in the sense that individuals may have private information at the 
time they choose beyond what can be inferred from their 2005 costs.  If a patient learns they 
have cancer just prior to choosing their 2006 plan, they would correctly forecast that their drug 
needs would likely exceed the average of those with similar 2005 spending. 
We address these concerns by developing a model with which we can identify the 
information available to consumers at the time when they choose.  The intuition behind this   27 
model is that we can determine if individuals know more than we can predict given just their 
2005 spending by evaluating whether their plan choices are responsive to the component of 2006 
spending which is not known in 2005. 
Suppose that utility is given by: 
  ??? = ???
∗ ?1 + ???  (7)  
where ???
∗  represents expected costs, defined as the individual’s expectations of out of pocket 
costs at the time when they make their choice (for ease of exposition, we momentarily ignore the 
premium and variance terms).  ???
∗  is not observed.  However, we do observe realized costs, 
which can be written as the sum of expected costs and a noise term, defined as the component of 
realized costs unknown to the individual at the time of plan choice: 
  𝐶?? = ???
∗ + 𝜂??  (8)  
where 𝐶?? denote the realized costs of individual i upon enrolling in plan j, ???
∗   denotes expected 
costs, and 𝜂?? denotes noise.  We can further decompose expected costs into the component of 
expected costs predictable from 2005 data, ???, and the component which is private information, 
???.  This yields: 
  𝐶?? = ??? + ??? + 𝜂??  (9)  
We assume that  ??? and ??? are independent of 𝜂??.
18   This assumption implies that individuals 
are aware at the time when they make their choices of the component of costs that can be 
predicted based on their previous year’s consumption.  This “rational expectations” assumption 
is substantive, but conforms with the baseline rational choice model that is implicitly tested by 
our analysis.  We discuss this issue further below. 
                                                 
18 Combined with the additive structure assumed above, the assumption of independence also rules out the case in 
which the degree of uncertainty about costs varies with the level of expected costs.  We relax this strong assumption 
below by assuming only that   and   are conditionally independent given the measured variance of costs.   28 
  If this were a linear model, the assumption of independence would be sufficient to 
identify ?1.  This assumption implies that we have a classical measurement error problem: 𝐶?? is 
a noisy measure of ???
∗ .  As usual, this problem can be solved with instrumental variables and in 
this case, ??? is a valid instrument – it is correlated with ???
∗  and uncorrelated with 𝜂??, so 
instrumenting for 𝐶?? with ??? would consistently estimate ?1.  Because the model is non-linear, 
we need to be more explicit about the form of the measurement error to obtain consistent 
estimation.  First, we rewrite equation (7) substituting in equation (8): 
  ??? = 𝐶???1 − 𝜂???1 + ???  (10)   
We assume further that ???~?(0,𝜏??
2 ) and ηij~?(0,σij
2).  Combined with equation (9), the 
normal updating formula implies: 
 











2   (11)   
We do not observe 𝜎??
2 or 𝜏??
2.  However, provided we assume that  ??𝑟 ??? + 𝜂?? ?,?  =
??𝑟(??? + 𝜂??|??,?) where ?? are the variables which define each cell – that is, we assume that 
there is no heterogeneity in the variance of costs within cells – we do observe  ??𝑟(??? + 𝜂??) ≡
𝜎??
2  .  This is the variance we construct from the 1000 cell exercise.  This still leaves us with a 
separate parameter to identify for each (i,j) pair.  We additionally assume that a constant fraction 
𝜏?𝑟??  of the variance of costs within cells is due to private information .  That is, we assume that 
𝜏??
2 = 𝜏?𝑟?? 𝜎??
2   and 𝜎??
2 = (1 − 𝜏?𝑟?? )𝜎??  
2
.  As written, this is a random coefficients model with 
one additional parameter beyond the  ’s - 𝜏?𝑟?? , the degree of private information. 
  How is 𝜏?𝑟??   identified?  Equation (11) suggests a simple intuition.  We can think of the 





2 =  29 
?1(1−𝜏?𝑟??)𝜎??   2
𝜎??  2 = ?1 1 − 𝜏?𝑟??   on 𝐶?? − ???.  Thus, the degree of private information is identified 
by the degree to which the coefficient on 𝐶?? − ??? falls short of the coefficient on 𝐶??.  If 
individuals have no information beyond what can be predicted from 2005 costs, we will observe  
𝜏?𝑟?? = 0 , and equation (10) will simplify to: 
  ??? = 𝐶???1 −  𝐶?? − ??? ?1 + ??? = ????1 + ???  (12)     
If on the other hand individuals have perfect information about 2006 costs, we will observe 
𝜏?𝑟?? = 1, and equation (10) will simplify to: 
  ??? = 𝐶???1 + ???  (13)     
In the interim case, individual’s choose based on a linear combination of 𝐶?? and ???, and the 
random coefficient on 𝐶?? − ??? captures the fact that different individuals with the same 𝐶?? and 
??? can have varying amounts of private information. 
This model also has implications for the variance term and the measurement of risk 
aversion.   The measured variance from the 1000 cell exercise 𝜎  ??
2 overstates the true variance in 
costs because some of this variation represents variation in realized costs which is unpredictable 
based on 2005 costs but is known to the individual at the time when they choose.  Thus, the 
correct variance to use in the model is (1 − 𝜏?𝑟?? )𝜎??
2  , the variance of the noise term.  To the 
extent that individuals are responsive to the variance term, omitting this correction will tend to 





                                                 
19 Note that this model does not directly allow for private information about the variance of costs; in some cases, 
individuals may learn that they are at risk of developing a certain condition which would require treatment with 
prescription drugs.  This knowledge would increase their expected out of pocket costs in the coming year and would 
also increase the variance in their forecast.  The model above does not allow for this type of information; while the 
model allows individuals in the same cell to have different values of expected costs based on their realization of 
private information, we continue to assume that all individuals in the same cell in the 1000-cell model face the same   30 
Reintroducing the variance and the premium term, we obtain: 
  ??? = 𝜋???0 + 𝐶???1 − 𝜂???1 +  1 − 𝜏?𝑟??  𝜎??
2  ?2 + ???  (14)   
where the distribution of 𝜂?? is given by equation (11). 
  Table 2 reports the results from estimating equation (14).  For computational reasons, we 
estimate this model on a much smaller sample by randomly selecting 15,000 patients from our 
earlier sample.  Column (1) reports our earlier results, column (2) reports the earlier specification 
on the new sample, and column (3) the results from equation (14) which allows for private 
information.    The model is estimated using the Laplace approximation developed in Hausman-
Harding (2007) with bootstrapped standard errors, including controls for the various plan 
characteristics.  This model is identical to the model in equation (6), adding the normally 
distributed noise term (which is a function of 𝐶?? − ???) and the variance adjustment. 
  The results in Table 2 suggest that there is substantial private information: individual 
choices take into account about 60% of the variation in out of pocket costs which cannot be 
predicted given their cell.  The results also imply that our earlier finding that the coefficient on 
realized costs is smaller than the coefficient on premiums is robust to any measurement error 
generated from the fact that individuals do not know realized costs at the time when they 
choose.
20  Moreover, financial plan characteristics such as the donut hole and deductible 
continue to enter highly significantly in this model.  Therefore, two of the major choice 
inconsistencies persist even when we model private information. 
  Interpreting the risk-related results in Table 2 requires examining in more detail our 
assumptions about what individuals know at the time when they choose.  If we take the model in 
                                                                                                                                                             
variance.  To the extent that this assumption is false, our model could be viewed as substituting the predicted 
variance given the variables used to construct the 1000-cell model for the actual variance.   
20 In other words, in a linear context, instrumenting realized costs for 2006 by predicted costs based on 2005 
characteristics does not much change the coefficient on out of pocket costs, indicating little bias from measurement 
error in our out of pocket cost coefficient.     31 
this section literally, we would conclude that individuals know much of what their costs will be 
to each plan in their choice set in the coming year so there is little insurance motive.  Under this 
interpretation, the variance in out of pocket costs is small for all plans because there is little 
uncertainty.  This means that any measured response to the variance term would imply high 
levels of risk aversion, and that the standard errors in our estimates of risk aversion are much 
larger than we concluded in the model ignoring private information.  The risk index in these 
models (obtained by dividing the variance coefficient by the premium coefficient and 
multiplying by 200) is comparable to what we obtained in our Appendix B simulations for 
CRRA = 3 with wealth = 17000. 
  The results reported in Table 2 are actually consistent with two models of choice with 
private information, however, each of which has very different consequences for our 
measurement of risk aversion.  The first model – assumed in the preceding analysis - is that 
individuals are using all available information to make forward-looking choices of plans for 
2006, but are simply mis-weighting premiums and out of pocket costs in making those choices.  
The alternative is that individuals are not using all available information, but rather are paying 
attention only to a part of their prescription drug expenditures.  For that portion to which they are 
attentive, individuals are rationally weighting premiums and out of pocket costs in the same way 
in making their decision.  Yet individuals do not respond to variation in out of pocket costs 
beyond that portion.  For example, it may be that individuals sometimes check whether plans 
cover one particular drug they will need in the coming year out of several that they actually take.  
For this one drug, they have foresight – even if they do not currently take the drug, they know 
they will need it in the coming year and choose on that basis.  Nonetheless, they are insensitive 
to variation across plans in the costs of covering the remainder of their drugs.    32 
In Appendix C, we supplement the model developed in the previous section by 
integrating the fact that the coefficient on premiums exceeds the coefficient on out of pocket 
costs into our measurement of private information in order to capture the possibility that 
individuals might be insensitive to a component of out of pocket costs.  Doing so, our estimate of 
the degree of private information now shrinks to 20% since we are interpreting the gap between 
premiums and out of pocket costs as evidence that some costs are unforeseen.  This gap – the 
“Fraction Observed” – implies that consumers are inattentive to almost 80% of the variation in 
out of pocket costs when they make their choices.  Because of this, there is now substantial 
variation in the risk facing individuals across plans which reduces the standard deviation in our 
measurement of the variance term.   As in the base model, we measure the variance coefficient is 
close to zero since the choices we observe are interpreted as a small response to substantial 
uncertainty rather than extreme sensitivity to a small amount of uncertainty.   
The bottom line from our models of private information is that our conclusions about the 
gap between the premium and out of pocket expenditure coefficients, and the powerful role for 
general plan financial characteristics in driving choice, are robust to a wide variety of 
specifications of out of pocket spending risk.  Our conclusion about the low degree of estimated 
risk aversion, however, is more sensitive to the precise specification of the model. 
 
Part VI: Heterogeneity 
  The independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption that underlies the conditional 
logit model places strong restrictions on how elasticities vary across plans and will lead to 
inconsistent estimates if preferences are heterogeneous across the population.   To address this 
concern, we assess the robustness of our model to heterogeneity driven by both observed and   33 
unobserved factors.  We first note that our model already allows for a substantial amount of 
individual variation: we estimated the coefficients on individualized out of pocket cost 
parameters.  Nonetheless, it may still be the case that preferences vary in ways not included in 
our model.  In terms of observed heterogeneity, we have reestimated our model for a number of 
separate samples: by gender; by age; and by tercile of the 2005 prescription drug expenditure 
distribution.  In every case, we find that our results are very similar across all samples.  In 
particular, each of these samples illustrates the three choice inconsistencies documented thus far: 
the premium coefficient is many multiples of the out of pocket cost coefficient; financial plan 
characteristics enter significantly; and the estimated degree of risk aversion is very low. 
  We therefore turn to considering unobserved heterogeneity.  We use the Laplace 
approximation developed by Hausman-Harding (2007) to estimate a model with normally 
distributed random coefficients on all included characteristics.  Our goal here is primarily a 
robustness check: does accounting for heterogeneity change any of our qualitative conclusions?  
  Table 3 shows the results of this analysis.  As before, column 1 is the original model on a 
small sample.  Column 2 adds random coefficients on premium, perfect foresight OOP, variance 
and quality, while column 3 adds random coefficients on all variables.  Again, we see that the 
choice inconsistencies are present even after accounting for unobserved heterogeneity.  Further, 
the magnitude of the coefficients estimated in the model without heterogeneity (which 
correspond to the mean of the random coefficients in this model) is not much affected.  We do 
estimate significant heterogeneity in the coefficients on premium, quality, the deductible and the 
generic donut hole term; allowing for this heterogeneity turns out not to have a significant impact 
on the welfare results we report below.   34 
  We can also interpret the results in Table 3 as a test of the IIA assumption.  To the extent 
that any of the coefficients are significant, this suggests that the IIA assumption does not hold 
exactly.  Nonetheless, the fact that the magnitude of the coefficients does not change 
substantially once we allow for random coefficients suggests that this assumption is not altering 
our conclusions.  
 
Part VII: Implications 
  Thus far, we have provided evidence of choice irregularities and shown that these 
irregularities are robust to the consideration of private information and preference heterogeneity.  
In this section, we attempt to determine the implications of these irregularities.  We do so in a 
strictly partial equilibrium framework, ignoring supply side considerations, computation costs 
and many other factors; these are discussed at the end of this section. 
  We proceed by defining a normative utility function that differs from the positive 
function we estimated above in that it satisfies the proposed restrictions on rationality.  That is, if 
individuals were fully informed, their choices would be given by the model estimated above but 
satisfying three additional restrictions: the coefficient on premiums is equal to that on expected 
out of pocket costs; financial plan characteristics other than premiums are excluded from the 
utility function once we control for the individual’s expected out of pocket costs; and individuals 
exhibit risk aversion in their plan choice.  We assume that the coefficient on premiums represents 
the marginal utility of a dollar if individuals were fully informed (this in turn determines the 
dollar value of quality variables and risk characteristics). 
We begin by extending the results reported in the previous sections to take into account 
risk and quality characteristics of plans.  We define the normative utility function to include   35 
premiums and out of pocket costs (equally weighted), variance and quality and value the latter 
characteristics in terms of dollars of premiums.  We then ask: if individuals had chosen the plan 
which maximizes this normative utility function rather than the plan which they did in fact 
choose, by how much would utility be improved?  The answer in this model is about 27% of 
total costs – this is comparable to the 30.9% we found when we looked only at cost savings.  The 
small difference is due to the fact that the lowest cost plans also have slightly lower quality 
ratings on average.
21 
We can interpret the 27% number as telling us the scope of the potential partial 
equilibrium utility gains.  If there were some intervention that would make individuals fully 
informed and fully rational, this is the amount by which their utility could be improved.  An 
alternative question is what reforms we could use to attempt to realize some of these gains.  
Some possibilities include directly providing individualized information about costs (as in Kling 
2008 et. al.) or appointing surrogates such as doctors or pharmacists to play some role in plan 
choice.  We pursue a different alternative here: can we improve welfare by removing some 
options from the choice set to reduce the scope for mistakes, or will individual heterogeneity 
mean that removing options inevitably reduces welfare? 
  To pursue this exercise, we need to forecast choices in a modified choice environment.  
We assume that the positive utility function we estimate on the full choice set also guides 
behavior when choosing from the smaller choice set.  We then evaluate the utility difference 
between the larger and smaller choice sets using a normative utility function which satisfies the 
restrictions discussed in the previous section.  When positive and normative utility functions 
                                                 
21 The 27% number uses the measured coefficient on the variance of costs which is close to zero.  We can 
alternatively impose a coefficient which corresponds to a coefficient of absolute risk aversion of .0003 (roughly 
CARA = 3 with wealth of 17,000).  In that case, the number rises to 27.6%.  The difference is small because the 
lowest cost plans offer comparable risk protection to the plans which are actually chosen.   36 
coincide, this is guaranteed to (weakly) reduce utility.  When positive choice behavior diverges 
from optimizing normative utility functions because individuals are confused or not fully 
informed, there may be gains from moving to a smaller choice set.   
  Appendix D develops the formal tools we use in this section to perform utility 
comparisons in a setting where positive and normative utility functions differ.  We show that the 
expected consumer surplus (CS) from a given choice set is given by: 
 
𝐸 𝐶𝑆  =   𝑥??? − 𝑥???   
?𝑥???  
  ?𝑥???  
?
+ ln ?𝑥???  
? ?
  (15)   
where ?  denotes the coefficients in the positive model and ? denotes the coefficients in the 
normative model.  This equation has a natural interpretation.  The second-term is the familiar 
log-sum term from logit consumer surplus evaluated on the positive utility function: this is what 
CS would be if the positive utility function were also the normative utility function.  The first 
term corrects the CS calculation for the fact that the log-sum term misevaluates the observed 
component of CS.  For each plan, this correction is equal to the difference in utility between the 
normative and positive utility functions times the probability that the plan is chosen. Throughout 
this section, the positive model we use is the one given in column (4) of Table 1, which includes 
all plan characteristics and brand-state fixed effects. 
  A major problem with carrying out this exercise is the role of omitted characteristics in 
the logit model.  It has been observed repeatedly in the discrete choice literature that assumption 
of independently distributed errors leads to implausible predictions of the welfare impact of 
additional choices (Berry and Pakes, 1999; Ackerberg and Rysman, 2002; Petrin, 2002).  For 
example, Ackerberg and Rysman (2002) point out that even in random coefficients models that 
relax the IIA assumption,  the fact that errors are independent conditional on the value of the   37 
random coefficients implies implausible welfare gains from additional products because there is 
no “congestion”; each additional product is assumed to add an additional desirable characteristic.   
  There are a number of ways of approaching this problem.  One route suggested by the 
analysis of Berry and Pakes (1999) is to consider a random coefficients model with either no 
error term or with a one dimensional omitted characteristic.  While we continue to use a positive 
model with the logit error terms included (in part because we think it plausible that there are 
more than one omitted characteristics which have some impact on choice), we begin by 
considering a normative model in this spirit which excludes the i.i.d. error terms.  In this model, 
only observed characteristics (including brand-state dummies) enter the normative utility 
function.
22 
A middle ground alternative is suggested by Ackerberg and Rysman (2002).  In their 
approach, an additional parameter is estimated to directly determine the impact of choice set size 
on utility.  We adopt a version of their approach here in which we use the variation in the number 
of PDP plans across states to determine whether PDP plans become more desirable as a whole 
relative to MA plans in states where there are a greater number of PDP plans.  In particular, we 
estimate a nested logit model where PDP plans are one nest and MA plans another, and include 
as “top level” regressors the number of PDP plans, the number of MA plans, and an MA plan 
dummy.  Because our information on the characteristics of MA plans is incomplete, we 
aggregate all MA plans into a single “outside option” whose premium is given by the average of 
the three most popular MA plans in each state, and we normalize all other characteristics to zero 
and include interactions of the out of pocket cost variables with a dummy for the MA plan (to 
prevent the specification of the outside option from spuriously contributing to the identification 
                                                 
22 The results we report here are for the model without random coefficients, although including them does not 
impact our results.  It would be necessary to include these in a positive model which excludes the error term so that 
all choices have a non-zero probability of being chosen.   38 
of these coefficients).  We randomly select for inclusion in the sample enough individuals who 
chose MA plans so that the proportion matches the proportion in the CMS data in 2006.  The 
results of this approach are given in Table 4. 
The log-sum coefficient lies between 0 and 1 indicating that the model is consistent with 
utility maximization.  The model implies that the logit errors overstate the utility gains from 
additional plans by a substantial margin.  If we normalize the estimated coefficient by the 
coefficient on premiums, the model implies that the logit errors overstate the utility losses of 
moving from a choice set with 47 PDP plans (the number in CA) to one with 3 plans by almost 
$300.  This value is difficult to assess in the abstract: the utility gains implied by the logit error 
terms from moving to 3 to 47 plans are highly dependent on which three plans we choose.  We 
can however compare this value to the utility gain implied by the logit errors in the context of a 
specific restriction, which we now do. 
In particular, we select the three plans which are predicted using the previous year’s data 
to have the lowest average cost in each state for inclusion in the small choice set.  Note that this 
does not imply that these plans are lowest cost for each individual in the state, let alone the 
optimal plans when other factors (such as quality and risk) are taken into account.   
Figure 4 shows the “utility landscape” that results from restricting to the three lowest cost 
plans in each state if we omit both brand-state dummies and omitted characteristics from the 
normative model.
23 The utility landscape shows the distribution that results if we randomly select 
                                                 
23 We still find welfare gains from the small choice set if we include brand-state fixed effects in the normative 
model, although they are reduced on average to 13.8%.  We feel they should be omitted from the model for three 
reasons.  Firstly, they generate implausible variation in the value of identical plans across states – the value of the 
Humana fixed effect has a range of almost $900 across states.  Secondly, they generate implausibly large variation 
across plans.  The range of brand-state fixed effects implies that individuals would be willing to pay $1700 (about 
170% of total costs) to go from the least desirable to the most desirable plan controlling for all financial 
characteristics.  The interquartile range is well over $600 (by way of comparison, the coefficient on the quality 
variable implies less than a $200 difference between the 25
th and 75
th percentile plans).  Thirdly, there are no 
obvious characteristics of plans beyond financial characteristics and quality which we think would impact   39 
a state in proportion to its population and determine the average percentage change in utility in 
that state from moving from the full choice set to the smaller choice set.
24  We see from the 
figure that restricting to the three lowest average cost plans yields increases in utility ranging 
from 0% to 30% in most states.  The variation across states stems from the fact that the lowest 
cost plans are relatively more inexpensive in some states than others and vary in their relative 
quality ratings.  The average percentage utility gain is 16.7%.  If we instead include omitted 
characteristics in the normative model, but adjust utility based on the estimated “number of 
plans” term, we find an average utility gain of 14.1%.  That is, whether we exclude omitted 
characteristics or include them and use a revealed preference approach to estimate the degree of 
“congestion”, we find comparable gains. 
  Figure 5 examines how the utility increases are distributed across the population.  We see 
from these figures that the potential gains from moving to a small choice set are not evenly 
distributed across people: welfare increases for about 50% of the population, decreases for about 
32% and remains constant for about 18%.   
A priori, one might expect that any reduction in utility from this policy would arise due to 
individuals purchasing an insufficient amount of insurance.  In fact, however, we find that the 
plans chosen in the small choice set offer slightly better risk protection on average than the plans 
which are chosen in the full choice set.  Because of this, we find that the average welfare gains 
are actually larger if we impose more substantial risk aversion than we estimated in our model.  
The fact that we exclude the lone plan which offers full coverage in the donut hole does 
                                                                                                                                                             
individuals if they were perfectly rational and fully informed.  That is, while individuals may (even rationally) 
decide to choose the AARP plan because they believe AARP will treat them well and because they are unable to 
fully evaluate the implications of plan characteristics for their financial well-being, in light of the fact that we can 
make this evaluation, we should no longer count the AARP fixed effect as part of welfare if it was only a heuristic 
for factors that we do observe.  
24 We report the results in this form to highlight the fact that we are choosing a different three plans in each state.   40 
adversely impact some of the highest cost individuals.  But the fact that all individuals are 
insured against catastrophic expenditures with only a modest co-insurance rate (once the donut 
hole ends) mitigates any utility losses from this exclusion.   
As noted at the start of this section, these results are subject to a number of caveats.  Most 
importantly, we ignore general equilibrium considerations.  We do so because of uncertainty 
about how to specify the institutional structure following a reform which reduced the size of the 
choice set.  Of course, there are possible reforms which would preserve the competitive nature of 
the bidding process while reducing the number of plans ultimately offered to consumers, such as 
first stage bidding across plans to offer one of a limited set of plan structures.  Our results are 
also driven in part by the fact that the three lowest cost plans in each choice set are also among 
the best plans in terms of average utility all things considered.  If we select three random plans in 
each choice set, we find welfare losses from restricting choice.   
On the demand side, our analysis assumes that the estimated choice process is fixed.  We 
assume that individuals choose according to the same positive utility function regardless of the 
size of the choice set – any utility increases from smaller choice sets arise because there is less 
scope for error.  If individuals are in fact better able to evaluate alternatives in a smaller choice 
set, then our analysis would understate the potential gains.   Moreover, surveys indicate that 
elders spend an average of 3 hours selecting their Part D plan (Kling et. al. 2008), so the dollar 
value of the hours saved by dramatically simplifying the choice process may be non-trivial as 
well. 
Part VIII: Conclusion 
The new delivery mechanism for a public insurance benefit introduced by the Medicare 
Part D program is a radical departure from the traditional public insurance model – and an   41 
exciting opportunity to understand the role of choice in the delivery of public insurance.  Using a 
unique data set we have provided the first evidence on the efficacy of the choices made by 
individuals under Part D.  While individual choices are consistent with maximizing behavior 
such as preferring plans with lower premiums, lower out of pocket exposure and higher quality, 
they are inconsistent with the standard model in three important respects: individuals 
underweight out of pocket spending relative to premiums; they overweight plan characteristics 
beyond their own circumstances; and they do not fully appreciate the risk-reducing aspects of 
plans for themselves. 
Our analysis in the last section suggests that given the normative assumptions we have 
outlined and given the positive model we estimated in the previous sections, there is substantial 
scope for increases in utility if consumers made better choices, and some of these gains could be 
realized by restricting to the three lowest cost plans.  Our models do not distinguish between the 
case of boundedly rational consumers choosing plans they trust as a heuristic given the time-
costs of fully evaluating choices, and the case where consumers simply err in underweighting out 
of pocket costs due to a lack of cognitive ability.  While this distinction is important for 
evaluating the potential efficacy of providing consumers with additional information, it is less 
relevant to considering the welfare impact of altering the choice set: in either case, our estimates 
imply that consumers would be better off if there were less scope for choosing the wrong plan. 
This analysis is subject to a number of caveats and should only be the first step in a richer 
modeling of the implications of choice in Part D plans.  In particular, this approach should be 
contrasted with the impacts of more benign approaches such as improving the information set 
available to seniors and their success in accessing that information set.  One interesting question 
raised by our analysis is why private firms have not emerged which provide such information.    42 
The analysis used here could form the basis of a general equilibrium model which takes into 
account the fact that consumer inattention to individualized characteristics may lessen the threat 
of adverse selection, but pose new problems as firms choose product characteristics in part to 
exploit consumer error.  Our analysis underscores the importance of such richer modeling before 
the public sector follows this model further, either within Part D or in other public insurance 
programs.   43 
References  
Ackerberg, D. A. and M. Rysman. 2002. "Unobserved Product Differentiation in Discrete 
Choice Models: Estimating Price Elasticities and Welfare Effects" NBER Working Paper.  
Agarwal, S., J. C. Driscoll, X. Gabaix, and D. Laibson. 2007. The Age of Reason: Financial 
Decisions Over the Lifecycle. Vol. Pension Research Council; Wharton School: National Bureau 
of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA.  
Berry, S. and A. Pakes. 2001. "Estimating the Pure Hedonic Discrete Choice Model" 
manuscript, Department of Economics, Yale University.  
Bertrand, M., D. Karlan, S. Mullainathan, E. Shafir, and J. Zinman. 2005. "What's 
Psychology Worth A Field Experiment in Consumer Credit Market" Yale University Economic 
Growth Center Discussion Paper, 918.  
Boatwright, P. and J. C. Nunes. 2001. "Reducing Assortment: An Attribute-Based Approach" 
Journal of Marketing, 65(3): 50-63.  
Fratiglioni, L., D. De Ronchi, and H. A. Torres. 1999. "Worldwide Prevalence and Incidence 
of Dementia." Drugs & aging, 15(5): 365.  
Harding, M. C. and J. Hausman. 2007. "Using a Laplace Approximation to Estimate the 
Random Coefficients Logit Model by Nonlinear Least Squares" International Economic Review, 
48(4): 1311-1328.  
Hausman, Jerry, Jason Abrevaya, and Fiona Scott-Morton. 1998. "Misclassification of the 
Dependent Variable in a Discrete-Response Setting" Journal of Econometrics, 87(2): 239-269.  
Heiss, F., D. McFadden, and J. Winter. 2006. "Who Failed to Enroll in Medicare Part D, and 
Why? Early Results" Health affairs, 25(5): 344-354.  
Heiss, F., D. L. McFadden, and J. K. Winter. 2007. "Mind the Gap! Consumer Perceptions 
and Choices of Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Plans" NBER Working Paper.  
Irons, Ben and Cameron Hepburn. 2007. "Regret Theory and the Tyranny of Choice*" 
Economic Record, 83(261): 191-203.  
Iyengar, S. S., W. Jiang, and G. Huberman. 2004. "How Much Choice is Too Much? 
Contributions to 401 (k) Retirement Plans" Pension Design and Structure: New Lessons from 
Behavioral Finance: 83-96.  
Iyengar, S. S. and E. Kamenica. 2006. "Choice Overload and Simplicity Seeking" University of 
Chicago Graduate School of Business Working Paper.    44 
Iyengar, S. S. and M. R. Lepper. 2000. "When Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too 
Much of a Good Thing?" Journal of personality and social psychology, 79(6): 995-1006.  
Kamenica, E. 2008. "Contextual Inference in Markets: On the Informational Content of Product 
Lines" American Economic Review, 98(5): 2127-2128-2149.  
Kling, J. R., S. Mullainathan, E. Shafir, L. Vermeulen, and M. V. Wrobel. 2008. 
"Misperception in Choosing Medicare Drug Plans" Unpublished paper, June.  
Kuksov, D. and J. M. Villas-Boas. 2006. "When More Alternatives Lead to Less Choice" Haas 
School of Business, University of California, Berkley, Mimeo.  
Lucarelli, C., J. Prince, and K. I. Simon. 2008. "Measuring Welfare and the Effects of 
Regulation in a Government-Created Market: The Case of Medicare Part D Plans" NBER 
Working Paper.  
Petrin, A. 2002. "Quantifying the Benefits of New Products: The Case of the Minivan" Journal 
of Political Economy, 110(4): 705-729.  
Salthouse, T. A. 1996. "The Processing-Speed Theory of Adult Age Differences in Cognition" 
Psychological review, 103(3): 403-428.  
     45 
Figure 1: 




Average mean and standard deviation for each PDP plan in CA 
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Figure 3: 
Percent Choosing Donut Hole Coverage and Added Cost by Expenditure Quantile 
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Figure 4: 
Welfare Landscape for Three Lowest Cost Plans in Each State 
 
Figure 5: 
Distribution of the Percentage Change in Utility in the Minimum 
Cost Plans Treatment 
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Table 1: Conditional Logit Results 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Premium  -.3208**  -.7663**  -.4990**  -.5218** 
(hundreds)  (.0024)  (.0038)  (.0061)  (.0069) 
OOP Costs (realized)  -.1861**  -.1172**  -.0961**  -.0967** 
(hundreds)  (.0014)  (.0015)  (.0015)  (.0016) 
Variance  -.0163**  -.0004  -.0006  -.0005 
(times 10^6)  (.0023)  (.0007)  (.0007)  (.0007) 
Deductible  x  -.2899**  -.1628**  -.1674** 
(hundreds)    (.0049)  (.0067)  (.0072) 
Donut Hole  x  3.023**  1.762**  1.865** 
    (.0181)  (.0277)  (.0303) 
Generic Coverage  x  .4203**  .3004**  .2700** 
    (.0140)  (.0175)  (.0177) 
Cost Sharing  x  3.282**  1.189**  1.057** 
    (.0538)  (.0741)  (.0778) 
# of top 100 on Form  x  .0937**  .0587**  .0644** 
    (.0007)  (.0017)  (.0018) 
Avg. Quality  x  .7398**  x  x 
    (.0039)     
Brand Dummies  NO  NO  YES  NO 
Brand-State Dummies  NO  NO  NO  YES 
Risk Index  10  0  0  0 
# of patients  95742  95742  95742  95742 
# of plans  702  702  702  702 
# of states  47  47  47  47 
# of brands  36  36  36  36 
Notes:  Table shows conditional logit results from estimating the model given in equation (6) by 
maximum likelihood.  Each column shows coefficients from a single regression.  The coefficients 
reported are the parameters of the utility function, not marginal effects.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  * indicates significance at the 5% level and ** indicates significance at the 1% 
level.  The first column includes only premium, realized out of pocket cost and the variance 
measure.  The second column adds controls for the indicated plan characteristics, the third 
column adds brand fixed effects and the fourth column adds brand-state fixed effects.  
Premiums, out of pocket cost and deductibles are in hundreds of dollars and the variance term 
is in millions.  The cost sharing variable is computed as the average value of covered 
expenditures divided by total drug expenditures for individuals in the choice set.  The average 
quality variable is a normalized version of the “average rating” index provided by CMS.  The risk 
index is twice the coefficient on the variance divided by the coefficient on premiums scaled by 
100.  In the model in the text, this value equals one million times the coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion.  
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% Private Information      .5818** 
      (.0618) 
Premium  -.7383**  -.7156**  -.7489** 
(hundreds)  (.0038)  (.0094)  (.0132) 
OOP Costs (realized)  -.1169**  -.1040**  -.1687** 
(hundreds)  (.0016)  (.0039)  (.0094) 
Variance  -0.0026  -.1103*  -.8574** 
(times 10^6)  (.0014)  (.0517)  (.2947) 
Deductible  -.2677**  -.3079**  -.2767** 
(hundreds)  (.0014)  (.1257)  (.0137) 
Donut Hole  2.823**  2.805**  2.870** 
  (.0181)  (.0490)  (.0478) 
Generic Coverage  .3066**  .4743**  .4784** 
  (.0143)  (.0341)  (.0347) 
Full Cost Sharing  2.990**  3.391**  2.829** 
  (.0546)  (.1417)  (.1743) 
# of top 100 on Form  .0939**  .0995**  .1005** 
  (.0007)  (.0019)  (.0021) 
Avg. Quality  .7167**  .7418**  .7512** 
  (.0039)  (.0098)  (.0095) 
Brand Dummies  NO  NO  NO 
Brand-State Dummies  NO  NO  NO 
Risk Index  1  31  229 
# of patients  95742  15001  15001 
# of plans  702  702  702 
# of states  47  47  47 
# of brands  36  36  36 
Notes:  Table compares conditional logit results with results from estimating the random 
coefficients model given in equations (11) and (14) using the Laplace approximation to the 
likelihood function developed by Hausman and Harding (2007) with bootstrapped standard 
errors.  Each column shows coefficients from a single regression.  The coefficients reported are 
the parameters of the utility function, not marginal effects.  Standard errors are in parentheses.    
* indicates significance at the 5% level and ** indicates significance at the 1% level.  The first 
column is identical to the second column of Table 1.  The second column estimates the same 
model on a random subsample of 15,000 and the third column estimates the random 
coefficients model on this same subsample.  Variable definitions are identical to Table 1.  The 
“Percent Private Information” field corresponds to the variable 𝝉????? in the model in the text.  
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Table 3: Random Coefficients Results 
    (1)  (2)  (3) 
Premium    -.7156**  -.7677**  -.7354** 
(hundreds)  (.0094)  (.0111)  (.0841) 
Std. Deviation of Premium  x  .2940**  .2659** 
      (.0560)  (.0330) 
OOP Costs (realized)  -.1040**  -.1091**  -.1193** 
(hundreds)  (.0039)  (.0052)  (.0171) 
Std. Deviation of OOP Costs  x  .0001  .0226 
      (.0003)  (.0506) 
Variance    -.1103*  -.1486  -.0866 
(times 10^6)  (.0517)  (.0926)  (.1237) 
Std. Deviation of Variance  x  .2035**  .2603 
      (.0685)  (.1769) 
Deductible  -.3079**  -.2524**  -.2354 
(hundreds)  (.1257)  (.0107)  (.1903) 
Std. Deviation of Deductible  x  x  .2922* 
        (.1452) 
Donut Hole  2.805**  2.775**  2.523** 
    (.0490)  (.0630)  (.3538) 
Std. Deviation of Donut Hole  x  x  .8078 
        (.5997) 
Generic Coverage  .4743**  .4845**  -.0037 
    (.0341)  (.0427)  (.2320) 
Std. Deviation of Generic 
Coverage  x    1.106* 
        (.5108) 
Full Cost Sharing  3.391**  2.083**  1.829 
    (.1417)  (.1852)  (1.304) 
Std. Deviation of Cost Share  x    .1290 
        (.4828) 
# of top 100 on Form  .0995**  .0992**  .1405** 
    (.0019)  (.0023)  (.0078) 
Standard Deviation of top 100  x    .1071 
        (.0790) 
Avg. Quality  .7418**  .7729**  .7622** 
    (.0098)  (.0090)  (.0358) 
Standard Deviation of Quality  x  .3753**  .3503 
      (.0146)  (.2182) 
Brand Dummies  NO  NO  NO 
Brand-State Dummies  NO  NO  NO 
Risk Index  124  124  124   51 
# of patients  15001  15001  15001 
# of plans    702  702  702 
# of states  47  47  47 
# of brands  36  36  36 
Notes: Table shows results from estimating the random coefficients model discussed in the 
heterogeneity section, estimated using the Laplace approximation developed in Hausman-
Harding (2007) with bootstrapped standard errors.  This model is identical to the model in 
equation (6), adding the normally distributed noise term (which is a function of 𝑪?? − 𝝁??) and 
the variance adjustment.  Each column shows coefficients from a single regression.  The 
coefficients reported are the parameters of the utility function, not marginal effects.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses.    * indicates significance at the 5% level and ** indicates significance 
at the 1% level.  In columns (2) and (3), each set of four rows reports the mean and standard 
deviation of random coefficient (and their standard errors).  The first column estimates the 
conditional logit model on the subsample of 15000 (and is identical to the second column of 
Table 2).  The second column adds random coefficients on financial characteristics and quality 
and the third column adds random coefficients on all variables.  Variable definitions are 
otherwise identical to Table 1.   52 











Premium  -.7156**  -.6090** 
(hundreds)  (.0094)  (.0237) 
OOP Costs (realized)  -.1040**  -.1150** 
(hundreds)  (.0039)  (.0072) 
Variance  -.1103*  .0233 
(times 10^6)  (.0517)  (.0144) 
Deductible  -.3079**  -.1202** 
(hundreds)  (.1257)  (.0172) 
Donut Hole  2.805**  2.585** 
  (.0490)  (.1124) 
Generic Coverage  .4743**  .1957** 
  (.0341)  (.0527) 
Full Cost Sharing  3.391**  2.248** 
  (.1417)  (.2005) 
# of top 100 on Form  .0995**  .1279** 
  (.0019)  (.0065) 
Avg. Quality  .7418**  .6829** 
  (.0098)  (.0293) 
# PDP Plans  x  -.0384** 
(impact on PDP utility)    (.0055) 
Log-sum Coefficient  x  .5943** 
    (.0260) 
MA Constant, # of MA 
Plans  NO  YES 
OOP / Var * MA Dummies  NO  YES 
Brand Dummies  NO  NO 
Brand-State Dummies  NO  NO 
Risk Index  31  -8 
# of patients  15001  26385 
# of plans  702  703 
# of states  47  47 
# of brands  36  37 
Notes: Table compares conditional logit results with nested logit results from the model with the 
number of plans adjustment.  Each column shows coefficients from a single regression.  The 
coefficients reported are the parameters of the utility function, not marginal effects.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses.    * indicates significance at the 5% level and ** indicates significance 
at the 1% level.  The first column estimates the conditional logit model on the subsample of 
15000 (and is identical to the second column of Table 2).  The second column estimates the   53 
nested logit model on this subsample, plus an additional sample drawn from the set of 
individuals who chose MA plans so that the proportions match that in the CMS data from 2007.  
An additional choice is added to all choice sets and is indicated as chosen for the additional MA 
individuals.  The nests include a nest for all PDP plans and a degenerate nest for MA plans.  The 
value of premiums for this choice is set to the average of the three most popular MA plans in 
the choice set.  The values of all other characteristics are set to zero for the MA option.  The 
model includes an MA constant and interactions between quintiles of OOP costs and quintiles of 
variance with an indicator for the MA plan so that the estimation results are not sensitive to 
normalization that all OOP cost and variance variables are zero for the MA plan.  In addition, the 
model controls for the number of MA plans in each choice set.  Variable definitions are 
otherwise identical to Table 1.   
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Appendix A: Utilization Effects 
  To evaluate the impact of utilization effects, let us consider a simple model in 
which total drug spending 𝑆 is a linear function of the coinsurance rate: 𝑆 = ? − ? ⋅ 𝐶? 
 and out of pocket costs are a linear function of total spending: ??? = 𝑆 ⋅ 𝐶?. 
Let 𝐶?0 denote the coinsurance rate of the plan in which the individual was 
actually enrolled and 𝐶?1 denote the coinsurance rate of an alternative plan.  Thus far, we  
have been operating under the assumption that 𝑆1
∗ = ? − ?𝐶?0 and ???1
∗ = 𝐶?1(? −
?𝐶?0).  Since in fact ???1 = 𝐶?1(? − ?𝐶?1), we have ???1 − ???1
∗ = −?𝐶?1(𝐶?1 −
𝐶?0).  Since in fact ???1 = 𝐶?1(? − ?𝐶?1), we have ???1 − ???1
∗ = −?𝐶?1 𝐶?1 −
𝐶?0 .  Normalizing the marginal utility of a dollar of out of pocket costs equal to 1, we 
have: 
  ?? = −??? ? + ?𝐶? ? + ??? = −??? ?
∗ + ?𝐶? ? 𝐶? ? − 𝐶?0  + ?𝐶? ? + ???  (16)   
Our current model omits the ?𝐶? ?(𝐶? ? − 𝐶?0) term.  This equation suggests that our 
current model understates the value of plans with high coinsurances because it omits the 
fact that out of pocket costs would be smaller in these plans because consumers would 
consume fewer drugs.  Of course, so far, this analysis ignores half the picture: the value 
of the foregone drugs.  This value is given by the area under the demand curve:  
𝐶?0 𝑆0 − 𝑆1  +
1
2 𝐶?1 − 𝐶?0 (𝑆0 − 𝑆1).  Subtracting this term from the previous 
equation, we obtain:   55 
  ?? = −??? ?









?𝐶? ? 𝐶? ? − 𝐶?0 
2
+ ?𝐶? ? + ??? 
(17)   
If coinsurances differ from the plan that consumers’ actually chose, consumers would 
always be better off than we predicted assuming no utilization effects because they are 
choosing their utilization optimally.   
  What is the magnitude of this coefficient?  The elasticity of spending with respect 
to the coinsurance rate is given by: 




?𝐶?  = −
?
𝑆 
so ? = −𝑆?.  For ? approximately -0.2 and 𝑆 approximately 1400 (the mean found in our 
data over the Part D enrollment period), this gives ? = 280 if individuals fully internalize 
the impact of utilization effects on their plan choices.   The magnitude of the omitted 
term is extremely small: even if an individual is considering switching from a plan with 
30% coinsurances to one with 75% coinsurances (moving from the 1
st to the 99
th 
percentile of what is observed in the data), the welfare difference due to utilization effects 
would be only $21 (
1
2 ⋅ 280 ⋅ .75 ⋅.452).  By contrast, the coefficient on cost sharing we 
estimate in the data implies that, controlling for the individual financial implications of 
plan choice, individuals would be willing to pay between $50 and $200 for an equivalent 
increase in coinsurances (dividing the estimated coefficient on cost sharing in our models 
by the coefficient on premiums and multiplying by 100 gives the dollar value of 
increasing cost sharing from 0% to 100%). 
While it is difficult to analytically sign any bias from omitting the utilization 
effect term, we can directly include this term to determine whether it has any impact on   56 
our estimates.  This exercise shows the impact it would have on our estimates if we 
assumed that individuals did fully incorporate utilization effects, in contrast to our current 
analysis where we assume that they lack sufficient foresight to take them into account.  
Note that we cannot directly estimate the coefficient on this term because the value of the 
term itself depends on which outcome was chosen.  Instead, we include the term 
 𝐶? ? 𝐶? ? − 𝐶?0 
2
 constraining the coefficient to be 140 times the coefficient on a dollar of 
premiums (our estimate of 
1
2? above) and evaluate whether this impacts the other 
coefficients in our model.
25  Doing so, we find almost no impact on our results.  The only 
noticeable change is an increase by 25% in the coefficient on cost-sharing, implying that 
individuals overvalue cost sharing slightly more than we had estimated in the absence of 
utilization effects. 
                                                 
25 Note that even if the functional form assumptions made in this section are inexact, we could interpret this 
term as an attempt to capture parametrically the fact that with utilization effects, plans with different 
coinsurances become relatively more desirable than we give them credit for being because individuals can 
reoptimize.   57 
Appendix B: A Simulation Exercise 
  In this section we demonstrate that the choice restrictions we test in our 
conditional logit model would be satisfied by a broad range of generalized utility 
functions.  We start by considering CARA and CRRA utility functions with a range of 
values for risk aversion.  We then take the cost distributions generated from the Part D 
data for each plan and simulate individuals’ choices using the assumed utility function.  
Finally, we estimate the conditional logit model using these simulated choices and check 
whether the restrictions considered above hold.  We add a small amount of noise to each 
observation so that the coefficients are identified at small levels of risk aversion.
26  The 
results of this exercise are reported in Appendix Table 1. 
The CRRA utility function is evaluated at wealth $17,000, the median financial 
wealth of those age 65-74 in 2004 (EBRI, 2005).  This is a conservative assumption 
which will tend to increase the curvature – and thus the degree of misspecification (it is 
especially conservative given that our analysis excludes individuals eligible for low-
income subsidies).  The absolute magnitude of the coefficients is determined by the 
amount of added noise (since this is the only omitted factor).  A more informative 
measure is the size of each coefficient relative to the coefficient on premiums: this 
measure gives the dollar value of a one unit change in the included variable. 
Regarding the first restriction, we see that, provided risk aversion is not too large 
(CRRA < 3, CARA < .0001), the coefficient on premiums equals the coefficient on OOP 
costs, and the two are very comparable in magnitude even at more extreme levels of risk 
aversion.  The second restriction appears to hold roughly over the same range: the plan 
characteristics are insignificant controlling for the mean and variance of out of pocket 
                                                 
26 The standard deviation of the noise to 1/20
th of the interquartile range of utility.   58 
costs provided CRRA < 3 and CARA < .003.  Even in the cases when they are 
significant, they are small in magnitude relative to premiums.  Dividing the coefficient on 
each variable by the coefficient on premiums gives the dollar value of a 1 unit increase in 
the variable.  In the CRRA = 10 case, the results would imply that individuals are willing 
to pay $9 for (full) donut hole coverage, would have to be paid $22 to go from a 0 
deductible to a $250 deductible, and would have to be paid $8 to accept generic donut 
hole coverage (since these values are driven entirely by misspecification there is no 
reason the signs should be sensible).  The third restriction is satisfied in the sense that we 
estimate risk aversion in all cases when the coefficient of risk aversion is greater than 0.  
The “risk index” is obtained by dividing two times the coefficient on the variance term by 
the coefficient on premiums.  We showed above that with CARA utility and normal 
noise, this index should approximate to (10
6 times) the coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion.  We see in Appendix Table 1 that this approximation seems to get things 
roughly correct in our sample (despite the fact that costs are non-normal), although it 
begins to break down when risk aversion is grows very large.    59 
Appendix Table 1: Simulation Results 
  CRRA (wealth = 17000)  CARA     
  1  3  10  0.0001  0.0003  0.0005 
Premium  -5.385**  -5.057**  -3.407**  -5.288**  -4.774**  -3.877** 
(hundreds)  (.0364)  (.0337)  (.0199)  (.0354)  (.0312)  (.0237) 
OOP Cost  -5.355**  -4.911**  -2.767**  -5.284**  -4.517**  -3.379** 
(hundreds)  (.0369)  (.0335)  (.0237)  (.0359)  (.0324)  (.0268) 
Variance  -1.903**  -6.293**  -19.87**  -2.600**  -9.244**  -16.28** 
(times 10^6)  (.1536)  (.1329)  (.1985)  (.1489)  (.1436)  (.1919) 
Deductible  -.0409  -.1567**  -.4452**  -.0424  -.2177**  -.3728** 
(hundreds)  (.0225)  (.0211)  (.0188)  (.0221)  (.0211)  (.0198) 
Donut Hole  -.0390  -.2506**  .2974**  .0210  -.0254  -.2393** 
  (.0863)  (.0781)  (.0549)  (.0657)  (.0703)  (.0626) 
Generic Donut Hole  -.0470  -.1412*  -.2829**  -.0325  -.1326**  -.2782** 
  (.0680)  (.0652)  (.0560)  (.0657)  (.0629)  (.0571) 
Cost Sharing  .1905  1.207**  2.791**  .2915  1.672**  2.726** 
  (.2546)  (.2425)  (.2114)  (.2505)  (.2393)  (.2230) 
# in Top 100  .0115  -.0045  -.0056**  .0110  -.0121**  -.0098** 
  (.0036)  (.0031)  (.0023)  (.0036)  (.0029)  (.0024) 
Avg. Quality Rating  -.1281  -.0508  .0525**  -.1186  -.0082  .0349** 
  (.0181)  (.0164)  (.0128)  (.0175)  (.0155)  (.0137) 
Risk Index  71  249  1166  98  387  840 
             
# of patients  94732  94732  94732  94732  94732  94732 
# of plans  702  702  702  702  702  702 
# of states  47  47  47  47  47  47 
# of brands  36  36  36  36  36  36 
Notes:  Table shows conditional logit results from estimating the model given in equation (6) by 
maximum likelihood using simulated choices.  Each column shows coefficients from a single 
regression.  The coefficients reported are the parameters of the utility function, not marginal 
effects.  Standard errors are in parentheses.    * indicates significance at the 5% level and ** 
indicates significance at the 1% level.  The sample differs slightly from that in Table 1 because 
individuals with greater than 17000 in total costs for any plan are dropped.  All simulated 
choices are based on the cost distribution generated from the realized costs of 200 individuals in 
the same decile of 2005 total costs, decile of 2005 total days supply of branded drugs and decile 
of 2005 days supply of generic drugs.  The first three columns compute expected utility using a 
CRRA utility function with wealth of 17000 and the indicated coefficient of relative risk aversion, 
assuming that individuals select the choice which maximizes expected utility.  The final three 
columns compute expected utility using a CARA utility function with the indicated coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion.  Variable definitions are otherwise identical to Table 1. 
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Appendix C: Modeling Unknown Component of Spending 
  As discussed in the text, the results of our private information model are 
consistent with two very different normative models of choice with private information.  
The first is that individuals are using all available information to make forward-looking 
choices of plans for 2006, but are simply mis-weighting premiums and out of pocket 
costs in making those choices.  The alternative is that individuals are not using all 
available information, but rather are paying attention only to a part of their prescription 
drug expenditures.  For that portion to which they are attentive, individuals are rationally 
weighting premiums and out of pocket costs in the same way in making their decision.  
Yet individuals do not respond to variation in out of pocket costs beyond that portion.   
  To address this point, we make two changes to the model.  First, we allow for a 
component of predicted costs which – while it can be predicted given 2005 characteristics 
– is still unknown to individuals at the time when they make their choice.  Since 
previously we allowed the coefficient on predicted costs to fall short of the coefficient on 
premiums, this modification just allows for heterogeneity across individuals in the 
portion of the variance in predicted out of pocket costs which is observed.  Second, we 
estimate the degree of private information by assuming that if OOP costs were fully 
observable, it would be weighted identically with 𝜋?? in patients’ utility functions.  
Conceptually, the estimates in the previous section apply to the case where the small 
coefficient on OOP costs reflects misweighting even though out of pocket costs are 
known (so there is no uncertainty), whereas the estimates in this section apply to the case 
where a component of out of pocket costs remains unknown.  We must distinguish these   61 
two cases to determine the appropriate variance in out of pocket costs for each 
alternative. 
  We begin by decomposing realized costs into predicted costs and the component 
which cannot be predicted given 2005 characteristics: 
  𝐶?? = ??? + ???  (18)   
Formerly, we assumed ??? = ??? + 𝜂?? and attempted to determine the magnitude of the 
component of ??? that was observable relative to ??? which we assume was fully 
observable.  In this model, we make an analogous decomposition, but we write ??? =
𝜂  ?? + 𝜂?? to distinguish ???, which is the degree of private information assuming 
individuals are aware of predicted out of pocket costs from 𝜂 ??, which is identified 
assuming individuals are fully aware only of premiums.  We also decompose predicted 
costs so that ??? = ? ? + ? ?? + ?  ?? where ? ??~?(0,????
2 𝜎?
2) and ?  ??~?(0, 1 − ? ???
2 𝜎?
2), 
where ? ?? is the component of predicted costs known to the individual at the time of 
choice, and ?  ?? is the residual component.  The variance of ??? captures the degree of 
heterogeneity in the amount of information possessed by individuals.  If this variance is 
large, then the same observed predicted costs might correspond to very different observed 
predicted costs across individuals and plans.  We assume that this variance is proportional 
to ??? − ? ?.  This allows for the fact that information about drugs has a multiplicative 
flavor: the information that a plan covers certain drugs has a larger impact on your 
choices if you consume more of those drugs or if those drugs are more costly.
27  The 
                                                 
27 The multiplicative model is also easier to estimate because it generates a random coefficients model 
where the random coefficient has fixed mean and variance across plans for a given individual.    62 
constant 𝜎?
2 which determines the degree of heterogeneity in information about predicted 
costs across individuals and plans is estimated. 
  Define (positive) utility as: 
  ??? = 𝜋??0 + ???
∗ ?0 + ???  (19)   
where ???
∗ = ? ?? + ??? is the component of out of pocket costs known to the individual at 
the time of choice.  Substituting in for ???
∗ , we obtain: 
  ??? = 𝜋??0 + 𝐶???0 − ?  ???0 − 𝜂???0 + ???  (20)   
As before, we apply the normal updating formula and obtain: 
 











2   (21)   
And: 
  ? ?  ?? 𝐶??,??? ~?  1 − ? (??? − ? ?),? 1 − ? (??? − ? ?)2𝜎?
2   (22)   
As before, we assume that 𝜏??
2 = 𝜏?𝑟?? 𝜎??
2   and 𝜎??
2 = (1 − 𝜏?𝑟??)𝜎??  
2
.  As noted, we have 
now assumed that the coefficient on the observed portion of OOP costs is ?0, the same as 
the coefficient on premiums.  The fact that the observed coefficient on realized costs is 
less than ?0 in the original conditional logit model is rationalized by two factors: first, 
part of predicted costs is unobserved (the ?  ???0 term) and second, part of the difference 
between realized and predicted costs is unobserved (the 𝜂???0 term).  Note that we can 
interpret the ?  ?? term as a random coefficient on ??? − ? ? with mean ?0 1 − ?  and 
variance ?0? 1 − ? 𝜎?
2.   
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In both cases, we determine the portion of the variance explained by the 
unobserved factor by determining magnitude of the coefficient relative to the magnitude 
of the coefficient on premiums.   𝜏?𝑟??  is now defined so that the coefficient on 
𝐶?? − ??? is ?0 1 − 𝜏?𝑟??  .  Likewise,  ?  is identified by the fact that the coefficient on   
is ?0 1− ? .  
Appendix Table 2 reports the results from estimation of this model.  A few points 
are notable.  First, our estimate of the degree of private information now shrinks to 20% 
since we are interpreting the gap between premiums and out of pocket costs as evidence 
that some costs are unforeseen.  This gap – the “Fraction Observed” – implies that almost 
consumers are inattentive to almost 80% of the variation in out of pocket costs when they 
make their choices.  Because of this, there is now substantial variation in the risk facing 
individuals across plans which reduces the standard deviation in our measure of the 
variance term, which we now measure to be close to zero (the point estimate is very small 
but would actually indicate risk-loving behavior).   This model controls more flexibly 
than previous models for the full impact of out of pocket costs on choice (taking into 
account both heterogeneity in the degree of private information and in the fraction of 
predicted out of pocket costs which is observed).  The fact that the magnitude of the 
premium coefficient increases by about .2 suggests that this coefficient was previously 
biased downwards by the failure to adequately account for this heterogeneity.   64 








Tau (% Private Info)    .5818**  .1703** 
    (.0618)  (.0042) 
Fraction Observed (alpha)      .2235** 
      (.0121) 
Std. Deviation Observed      1.778** 
      (.5466) 
Premium  -.7156**  -.7489**  -.9207** 
(hundreds)  (.0094)  (.0132)  (.0692) 
OOP Costs (realized)  -.1040**  -.1687**   
(hundreds)  (.0039)  (.0094)   
Variance  -.1103*  -.8574**  .0538* 
(times 10^6)  (.0517)  (.2947)  (.0237) 
Deductible  -.3079**  -.2767**  -.2668** 
(hundreds)  (.1257)  (.0137)  (.1300) 
Donut Hole  2.805**  2.870**  3.670** 
  (.0490)  (.0478)  (.0457) 
Generic Coverage  .4743**  .4784**  .9791** 
  (.0341)  (.0347)  (.0510) 
Full Cost Sharing  3.391**  2.829**  2.909** 
  (.1417)  (.1743)  (.1580) 
# of top 100 on Form  .0995**  .1005**  .1006** 
  (.0019)  (.0021)  (.0017) 
Avg. Quality  .7418**  .7512**  .7791** 
  (.0098)  (.0095)  (.0081) 
Brand Dummies  NO  NO  NO 
Brand-State Dummies  NO  NO  NO 
Risk Index  31  229  -12 
# of patients  15001  15001  15001 
# of plans  702  702  702 
# of states  47  47  47 
# of brands  36  36  36 
Notes:  Table compares conditional logit results with results from estimating the random 
coefficients model given in equations (20), (21) and (22) using the Laplace approximation to the 
likelihood function developed by Hausman and Harding (2007) with bootstrapped standard 
errors.  Each column shows coefficients from a single regression.  The coefficients reported are 
the parameters of the utility function, not marginal effects.  Standard errors are in parentheses.    
* indicates significance at the 5% level and ** indicates significance at the 1% level.  The first 
column estimates the conditional logit model on the subsample of 15000 (and is identical to the 
second column of Table 2).  The second column again reports the results from the model with 
no unknown component of spending (the third column of Table 2) and the third column   65 
estimates the model with an unknown component of spending.  The “Percent Private 
Information” field corresponds to the variable 𝝉????? in the model in the text.  The fraction 
observed field corresponds to the variable ? and the standard deviation observed field 
corresponds to ??? ? − ? 𝝈𝝁
?.   Variable definitions are otherwise identical to Table 1.   
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Appendix D: Mathematical Details of Utility Analysis with Mistakes 
  In this section, we derive the formulae used to compute utility when positive and 
normative utility functions differ.  We assume that choices are given by the positive 
utility function: 
 
  ?  ?? = 𝑥???   + ? ??  (23)   
Whereas they are evaluated using the normative utility function: 
  ??? = 𝑥??? + ???  (24)   
We assume in all of our models that the marginal utility of income is constant and given 
by the estimated coefficient on premiums (?0).  In the case where omitted characteristics 
are excluded from the normative utility function (??? = 0), the analysis is 
straightforward.  Utility depends only on the characteristics of the plan which is chosen, 
and since we assume a constant marginal utility of income, this is given by 
???
?0
.  To 
evaluate the utility gains from moving to a small choice set, we compare the plan chosen 
from the full choice set with choices simulated using equation (23) in the small choice 
set. 
  The case where omitted characteristics do continue to enter normative utility is 
more involved.  In this case, ??? = ? ??.  For simplicity, we normalize ?0 = 1.  As is 
standard in discrete choice models, we compute the expected value of consumer surplus: 
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  𝐸 𝐶𝑆  = 𝐸(max???)  
=  𝐸(???|?  ?? > ?  ?? for all 
?
?
? ≠ ?)?(?  ?? > ?  ??for all ? ≠ ?) 
(25)   
The second term in the summation is the ordinary logit probability computed from the 
positive utility.  To simplify the first term, we use the fact that if ?1,…,?𝑛 are 
independent type I extreme value random variables with scale parameter 1 and location 
parameters ?1,…,?𝑛 respectively, then the conditional distribution of ?? given that ?? is 
the maximum of ?1,…,?𝑛 is also type I extreme value with location parameter ln  ??? 𝑛
? .  
We can rearrange the first term so that: 
  𝐸 ??? ?  ?? > ?  ?? for all ? ≠ ?  = 
𝐸(𝑥??? + ???|𝑥???   + ??? > 𝑥???   + ??? for all ? ≠ ?) 
𝐸(𝑥??? + ???|𝑥??? + ??? > 𝑥???   + 𝑥??? − 𝑥???   + ??? for all ? ≠ ?) 
(26)   
Substituting in using the above result, we obtain:    68 
  𝐸 𝑥??? + ??? 𝑥??? + ??? > 𝑥???   + 𝑥??? − 𝑥???   + ??? for all ? ≠ ?  = 
ln ?𝑥??? +  ?𝑥???  −𝑥???  +𝑥???
?≠?
  = 
ln ?𝑥???  1 +  ?𝑥???  −𝑥???  
?≠?
   = 
𝑥??? + ln ?−𝑥???    ?𝑥?? ?   +  ?𝑥???  
?≠?
   = 
𝑥??? − 𝑥???   + ln ?𝑥???  
?
 
(27)   
Substituting this back into the expression for expected consumer surplus, we obtain: 
 
𝐸 𝐶𝑆  =   𝑥??? − 𝑥???   
?𝑥???  
  ?𝑥???  
?
+ ln ?𝑥???  
? ?
  (28)   
This equation has a natural interpretation.  The second-term is the familiar log-sum term 
from logit welfare evaluated on the positive utility function: this is what welfare would be 
if the positive utility function were also the normative utility function.  The first term is 
the “mistake term”.  This term corrects the utility calculation for the fact that the log-sum 
term misevaluates the observed component of utility.  For each plan, this correction is 
equal to the difference in utility between the normative and positive utility functions 
times the probability that the plan is chosen.  
 
 
 